THEOLOGY

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EDITORIAL

Mr. Lionel Curtis, in putting out the final volume of his trilogy *Civitas Dei* (Macmillan, 5s.), lays the fruit of a long and close experience of world affairs at our disposal. The previous volumes have been historical and critical. This one is constructive. The guiding principle of it is admirable. It is that strategy is far more important than tactics. You may often be puzzled by the difficulty of deciding between two methods of procedure, but if you set yourself to consider the ultimate end it is probable that the better procedure will choose itself. The value of this devotion to principle is illustrated by interesting examples from political history, but its basis is the author's religious faith. It is his conviction that there is a tide in the affairs of men, and that tide is not the blind swirling of unconscious waters over a defenceless area, but a real tide with a real purpose. Nay, it is more than a physical tide, inasmuch as the inundated area itself can have some measure of co-operation with the process. "The supreme Creator has brought into being creatures who can join in the work of creation because he has given them power of discovering for themselves some knowledge of what he and how he is working." "The final reality behind the universe is personality carried to its highest degree, expanded to an infinite power." This inference is sealed for him by the testimony of the Christian story. "The personality of Jesus is the highest clue that men have to the nature of God. He told us that God is love, and our reason and conscience respond to the thought. But his life and death make us see, as nothing else can, what that formula means."

This Christian conviction is not expressed in the language of orthodox theology. And that, it would seem, for two reasons:

(*a*) Mr. Curtis writes: "I believe that Jesus of Nazareth was such a man" (*i.e.*, such as to master personal desires and do what is right regardless of mental and physical anguish), "wholly divine and not less divine because he was human. When such a man had lived and died, and his life and death were on record, creation had passed to a higher plane. 'Be ye perfect as your Father also is perfect' is in form a command, but in substance a promise." So far, so good. But he continues: "With that promise in mind, I am not prepared to assert that no human being will ever again master, as Jesus mastered, the mysterious principle of evil in our nature. I am not prepared to say that no other creature who lives on this earth will ever attain to the plane which he reached." We can see well enough what he means, and can welcome the resolute optimism that looks far ahead. St. John says something like it: "It doth not yet appear what we shall be," but, even apart from the fact that he is not speaking of the life on earth, St. John maintains what may be called a metaphysical distinction between the Logos and created lives. The truth is that if we are thinking of the life of Jesus merely as the life in which perfect harmony with God was in fact achieved, such harmony might in course of time duplicate or even multiply itself. But if we are thinking of it as the creative arrival of Salvation, Redemption, Regeneration, that which had not been in the world before and could have come from no other quarter, its effect, whatever that may be, remains an act of grace.

(*b*) In the second place, Mr. Curtis stumbles over what he conceives to be the commonly accepted idea of revelation. Such revelation, he says, is held to have been given through supernatural channels, conveyed in visions or otherwise to the minds of prophets, and its authority often attested by the power to work miracles. "It was clear to St. Paul that, were he convinced that Jesus in person had not made himself known to his followers after death by supernatural means, the faith that he preached would be worthless." The natural comments on this are first of all that there is one very stubborn historical fact about the prophets. They all say with one accord that they have not simply thought out their message. It was given to them. Their text always is: "Thus saith the Lord." It is of course conceivable that they were all mistaken about this, but at least they are unanimous. The constraint of which they were conscious often overrode their own inclinations, but there it was, or there it seemed to them to be. Has any other explanation of the prophetic phenomena been put forward

which is more satisfying than the explanation put forward by the prophets themselves ?

Then in regard to the authority to be assigned to the revelation through Christ, Mr. Curtis is guided in his own definition of it by the concluding sentence of Dives and Lazarus: "Neither will they be persuaded, though one rose from the dead." But this is only the rejection, in the manner of the Temptation, of a spectacular and purely evidential miracle, which would have meant the taking of lower ground. Moreover, the five brothers are not, it would seem, persons of high capacity. It is not that they are so spiritual that they are independent of historical testimony. It is that they are so earthbound that not even a staged miracle would shake their complacency. Further, is the Pauline position fairly stated ? There is of course the famous verse, "Then is our preaching vain, your faith also is vain." This, by itself, looks like a simple appeal to the Easter story. But there is much more in St. Paul than that. He is, for example, appealing to his own (post-Ascension) experience as well as that of "Cephas" or "James" or "all the apostles" or the "five hundred brethren," and he is conscious all the time of the experience of the Corinthians themselves: "Such were some of you: but ye were washed, but ye were sanctified, but ye were justified." Above all, there is that remarkable word ὁρισθέντος in Rom. i. 4. Surely that means that the promised Son was born and that then at His Resurrection, the limitations that were necessary for a single human life having been broken, it became possible for us to recognize Him as what He truly was and always had been. "Designated" meets at the same time the Adoptionist heresy, and Mr. Curtis's suggestion that St. Paul's faith was a second-rate thing.

Is our appeal to the Resurrection really no more than what Mr. Curtis criticizes ? "Can anyone picture and describe" (he says) "an event supernatural or natural which would settle that question once for all and place it for ever beyond dispute ?" But the Resurrection is not put forward as answering the question once for all for everybody. It was not spectacular. It is nowhere suggested that there could have been any acknowledgment from Caiaphas or Pilate or even the centurion: "Not to all the people, but unto witnesses that were chosen before God, even to us." An evidential weakness, perhaps, but a weakness inherent in the real strength of the case for faith. The real strength of the case is that the event belongs to two worlds. It took place on the physical plane

and was historical enough to satisfy the requirements of a world in which space and time exist and must be reckoned with. It had its roots in the eternal world in which are found both its own meaning and the possibility of our faith in it. Mr. Curtis's difficulty is that it is a miracle. The reply is that it is a necessary miracle, like Creation. Without it we are left to the conclusion that Good Friday is the end. Even so before Creation, if an illogical expression be allowed, it would have appeared to an observer, if there had been one, that there was no purpose. The Resurrection was the necessary act of God, necessary in order to establish the truth that human life is not wasted, and that the kind of life which had been lived by Jesus of Nazareth is not merely not wasted, but is the creative victory. It is, by ordinary standards, a miracle, supernatural, unique. But it has its place in the universe, on the throne thereof. It is not a crude miracle, which startles by its queerness. It is the necessary miracle, which reassures by its sanity. St. Peter on the Day of Pentecost put this in simple words: "Whom God raised up, having loosed the pangs of death, because it was not possible that He should be holden."

On Mr. Curtis's political advice we have no competence to offer a verdict. It is attractive. He has before him all the time the development of a commonwealth, and he is actuated by high motives of public duty. The League, he pronounces, must be considered to have failed, or perhaps rather to have been betrayed by the nations. Articles 10 and 16 are unworkable. "They are corpses hung round the necks of the nations that signed them and broke them, poisoning the life of the world." He believes that Great Britain, Australia and New Zealand could form themselves into a commonwealth which other nations would then want to join. Sovereignty, as it is at present understood, must go, and it is the task of statesmanship to present a policy to the Churches, and for the Churches then to create the temper of mind which will make it possible. It is attractive, and if the appeal of the Churches is capable of going even deeper than he supposes, so much the better.

The death of Burnett Hillman Streeter, Provost of the Queen's College, Oxford, is a loss hard to estimate, impossible to repair. Few men have ever touched so many points of theological enquiry and have adorned them all. For ourselves, we met him first about 1905, when he was a young Oxford Don, ungainly, eccentric, ingenious. He was accomplished, and full of ideas, but he did not then carry on the surface evidence of the remarkable powers which he was to shew later. But he must have been a man of parts. Between then and 1912

he became an important member of an important group of young Oxford theologians. The group became famous with *Foundations*, of which Streeter was responsible for one of the most considerable and most controversial articles. His crew, though it had some powerful oarsmen in the middle of the boat and a very neat waterman in the present Bishop of Derby as bow, seemed to owe not a little to him at stroke. His next effort was less theologically audacious, more scholarly. It was made in an imposing series of contributions to *Oxford Studies in the Synoptic Problem*, and it was very solid and constructive. He contrived in it after his manner to combine laborious research and brilliant guesses. He had a way of bringing a human touch to bear on his literary investigation ("Mark never can resist a good story") which was very pleasant. The *opus magnum* in this field was, of course, *The Four Gospels*, in which a number of major problems in regard to the text of the Gospels, the early history of St. Luke's Gospel, the connection of all four Gospels with Metropolitan churches, and many, many other things, were handled with easy mastery. It was a consummate piece of work.

In the meantime he had touched many other topics. The group which had produced *Foundations* moved for the most part in a more catholic direction. Streeter came to be associated with a rather different group, containing Miss Dougal, Cyril Emmet, and that elfish genius Archie Turner. They produced *Concerning Prayer*, *Immortality* and *The Spirit*. Streeter himself went on to break further new ground in *Reality*, a book which found many interested and admiring readers among the intelligentsia. His great effort in this vein was his volume of Bampton Lectures, *The Buddha and the Christ*, the fruit of a journey to the East and of his own learning, ingenuity and Christian conviction. There was never any doubt about the last, though it was reaffirmed in a new way in his most recent book, *The God who Speaks*. He had by this time come under the influence of the Buchman Groups. From being a benevolent observer he had become a participant, and it was evident from this book that he no longer approached the New Testament as containing material for ingenious puzzle-solving by a Christian, puzzle-loving mind, but with a new simplicity. It may be conjectured that his next big book would have been a masterpiece. Now, alas! we shall not have it. He has carried his learning, his acuteness and his wit into a world where Adventure finds Reality and Reality does not cease to be adventurous. R.I.P.

A SOCRATIC DIALOGUE ON THE EXISTENCE OF DEVILS

And he looked out and saw an animal which had this form: its head and body were those of a man, and its legs and feet those of an ass. When blessed Anthony saw it he only made the sign of the Cross over himself and said: " How can anyone imagine that the Evil One is crafty ! Is it not within his cunning to know that I am quite aware that these are empty phantasms ?" Then to the creature: " If there be anything in the power of him that sent thee, come hither, and perform that which thou wast sent to do. But if Christ, Who shall make an end of thee, liveth, and if He be true, let thy destruction take place immediately." At the word " Christ " there fell upon the creature trembling, and he took to flight, and as he was running along terrified he fell down and burst asunder at no great distance from Anthony's abode.—ST. ATHANASIUS: *Life of Anthony.*

Socrates, having left the Shades for a brief visit to the earth in 1936, *speaks.*

GLAUCUS. It is a long time since we have met, Socrates. I infer that you have been away from your native country.

SOCRATES. Yes, indeed, Glaucus, I have been on a considerable journey; in fact, my wandering steps have led me to Egypt.

GLAUCUS. Egypt ! What took you there ? To visit the tombs and temples of the Pharaohs ?

SOCRATES. These are indeed worthy of inspection. But my journey was undertaken for quite a different purpose.

GLAUCUS. And what may that have been ?

SOCRATES. To follow the footsteps of the hermits of the desert, those spiritual athletes who went to meet and overcome the evil demons who, we are told, inhabited these dry places.

GLAUCUS. But surely you do not believe in these old fables ?

SOCRATES. It is easy to dismiss any question with a phrase, but this phrase must be subjected to examination. " Fables " implies falsehood, and if we are to examine the subject we must not begin by begging the question. You are right in eschewing falsehood, but we must first examine these stories, and then, if we find them false, reject them. Again, surely you would not reject anything merely because it was old, for if it can be shewn that the roots of a belief go back to a long past and that that belief has been entertained by countless generations of all races of every religion and also by the greatest philosophers and the wisest of mankind, that would be an argument for the belief and not against it. Let us not be

afraid of our reason, but use it boldly and see whither our arguments take us. But come, let us examine this belief, for doubtless you have excellent reasons for labelling it as false, apart from the fact of its being old ?

GLAUCUS. Yes, indeed, Socrates; and let me begin by saying that it is a matter of common knowledge that it is rejected by all those learned men who have applied themselves to the study of natural science.

SOCRATES. That, indeed, seems on the surface to be a good reason for your opinion, for the investigations of scientists, as they are called, have brought to our notice many surprising things. And it is a fact, is it not, that what these men of science formerly taught is now rejected by their successors ? Thus, if I am not mistaken, you would designate the former as old and discredited by the latter ? In this sense I understand your reference to the belief we are discussing as " old." Is not this the case ? Whether it is false or not we must establish by our discussion, and I find myself fortunate in having an intelligent man like yourself as my partner in our enquiry. Shall we proceed ?

GLAUCUS. With all my heart, Socrates.

SOCRATES. But first I must ask an important question. You, Glaucus, are conscious of your existence as a personality ?

GLAUCUS. You may be happy on that score, Socrates, for it appears to me that neither I nor any other intelligent man could be in doubt of his own existence.

SOCRATES. You have answered as I expected, and I feel I must apologize for asking such a question. But I have come across certain philosophers who seem to be in doubt on this important point. Had you answered in the negative, I should have been obliged to decline the discussion of our subject, for no man can profitably conduct an argument with a non-existence. May I go a step further and ask whether you regard me as having a personality and one separate from your own ?

GLAUCUS. Certainly I do so regard you.

SOCRATES. And that besides ourselves there are other personalities in the world, men each of whom pursues his own activities and is capable of discussing questions such as we are engaged upon at the present time ?

GLAUCUS. Most certainly, and let me say at once that all men of science that I know are of the same opinion.

SOCRATES. Just so. Men who busy themselves with the contemplation of what they see in the universe and draw deductions therefrom are not likely to deny their own or anybody else's existence. Let us rejoice, and hasten to register

the fact that both you and your men of science on the one side and I and those who think with me on the other are in agreement, namely, that there are divers personalities in the world and that they are intelligent beings of varying powers, some being of great capacity, others the contrary. And may we also agree that some seem naturally inclined to good thoughts and actions and others to those which are evil ?

GLAUCUS. That also is evident.

SOCRATES. Are there not different sciences (I use the term in its proper sense and do not confine it to the natural sciences as many do in popular speech) ? And forasmuch as we are individually incapable of covering the whole ground of knowledge, do we not go for information to those who are experts in the particular science concerned ? There, are for example, besides the natural sciences, political science or knowledge of government, and mathematical science and theological science, and many others.

GLAUCUS. Stay, Socrates, I do not admit theology as a science at all.

SOCRATES. That is a common error, to refuse the attributes of knowledge to those working in a sphere different from one's own, a sphere in which we are either not interested or one to which we are somewhat hostile; this, I conceive, proceeds from the fact that, though distinct, the sciences in some senses overlap and the conclusions of one have a tendency to influence the conclusions of another. Theologians, for instance, have in the past criticized the professors of natural science for putting forward views (to which they were fully entitled) which they considered contrary to their own. But you, Glaucus, who have had a liberal education will surely not fall into this vulgar error; rather, as you are unable to embrace all knowledge, you will go in each case to that person whom you can reasonably trust to provide you with the best information on the subject before you.

GLAUCUS. I should like to have this point made clear.

SOCRATES. Then let us take chariot-driving. You would go to a friend with a knowledge of horses to select your animal.

GLAUCUS. Assuredly.

SOCRATES. And for the harness you would go not to the same man, but to one who was a trustworthy expert in harness-making, and similarly with the chariot, so you would assure yourself of a worthy equipage. Supposing, again, you wished to build a house. You would first consult a political expert who could advise you as to the security of the government under which you proposed to live, a geological expert who would tell you of the risks of earthquakes, a physician of the

salubrity of the site. Would you not consult all these before going to the architect whose training had not included these matters ?

GLAUCUS. I begin to understand your meaning, Socrates.

SOCRATES. Now on the question of the existence of devils and other spirits you would naturally consult the theologian, whose profession it is to deal with such matters. But for the purpose of our discussion I propose to omit all reference to theology, to gather what we can from the conclusions of natural science and to accept them as the premises of our argument, seeing how far they will help us. Such conclusions, I think, we must accept without reserve. For instance, I understand that a learned man called Einstein has proved that the universe is not infinite but bounded. This is a difficult conception for you and me, but are we competent to express a contrary opinion ? Surely not. On the other hand, if Einstein had previously maintained that 2 and 2 made 5 we should be disposed to mistrust him, for on this elementary proposition we are competent to express a judgment. Again, if a mathematician or an astronomer were to deny the existence of spirits we should pass him by as dealing with a science in which he had no claim to knowledge, just as theologians, and even plain people like you and me, smiled when somebody suggested that the exchange of spiritual essences should be verified by a pair of scales. Now let us return to the advance of scientific knowledge. There was a time, was there not, when astronomers believed that the sun went round the earth, so that the earth was the centre of the universe ?

GLAUCUS. Yes, and that old theory has been long discarded in the light of modern knowledge.

SOCRATES. So that the universe has become a totally different thing from what it was believed to be, for not only is the earth but an insignificant planet among those the telescope has reached, but the very stars we see in countless multitudes in the heavens are some of them themselves suns and the centres of other systems than our own. Has not the universe become such a mighty thing that it baffles our comprehension and can only be fully grasped by mathematicians ?

GLAUCUS. That is indeed the result of modern scientific researches.

SOCRATES. You will doubtless have observed certain discussions from time to time as to whether other planets, such as Mars, are inhabited ? All these discussions appear to be idle, for the underlying assumption is that all intelligent beings must be like ourselves, with similar bodies (an assumption

which seems to carry us back to the astronomy of Ptolemy and an earth-centred universe). But surely this is to assume that all bodies are composed of the same material—*i.e.*, if I understand the latest scientific theories aright, of the same disposition of electric systems which are the basis of what we call matter—and subject to the same conditions as our own. There seems to be no reason why some kind of body may be so unhuman as to live with as much comfort in that chemical product called fire as we do in that chemical product called air. But why bodies at all? The personalities which you call Socrates, and I, Glaucus, and which are now engaged in the examination of lofty speculations, are clearly not the chemical constituents that go to make up what we call bodies, but something far higher and nobler. And when—which the gods postpone!—I see Glaucus dead before me I shall not say "This is Glaucus," but "This was Glaucus," for personality, and will which accompanies personality, will have passed away with the spirit of Glaucus and only the material tenement will remain. And here it seems proper to say to those who accept spiritual influences but deny spiritual personalities that we have no evidence for any kind of spirit divorced from personality; we are only cognizant of spirits with personality.

But now I come to the argument with which your scientific friends, wholly dispassionate in this matter, have provided me, and to it I beg your careful attention. Is it reasonable to believe that in all this mighty cosmos which they have disclosed the only intelligent personalities are those imprisoned in those few and frail bodies which inhabit the tiny speck which we call earth? On this you, my dear Glaucus, are fully competent to form an opinion, and I say boldly that the presumption against the absence of intelligent beings, whether good or evil, except on this earth is so great that only overwhelming evidence on the other side could establish it, and of such evidence not the slightest exists. But perhaps you have some observation to offer?

Glaucus. A difficulty arises with regard to the argument you have just advanced; I admit its cogency if valid. But are we not mixing things physical with things psychical in using the immensity of the material cosmos as an argument for spiritual inhabitants?

Socrates. I think what you mean is this. Can we speak of a wholly spiritual being as being in a place?

Glaucus. Yes, that is my difficulty.

Socrates. I commend my Glaucus' acute understanding; the objection is a proper one and I must deal with it. It is clear that a spirit cannot be in a place in the same way as a

body can (nor, indeed, can we measure spiritual movements by our standard which depends upon the physical motion of the heavens). But without going too deep into philosophy, will it content you if I say that a spirit is in a place in the same sense that the spirit of Glaucus is in his body? We cannot point to any part of your body and say "Glaucus is there," but the connexion between soul and body is close enough for me to say that Glaucus is there and not somewhere else. And, indeed, that connexion is so close that even when life is departed the spirit, in cases where it has completely dominated the body, its grosser partner, seems loth to depart, as if it would continue to work through that with which it has been so long associated. But this is a speculation foreign to our present argument, to which I return by saying that a spirit is in a place according to the manner of a spirit.

GLAUCUS. There is another difficulty to be removed. If evil spirits indeed exist, and if they have made themselves known by visible appearances to men in past ages, why is it that their manifestations have now ceased?

SOCRATES. In my reply to you I must not be understood to admit that these manifestations have ceased, as I shall presently explain. That they did exist at one period I think I can prove by an argument which will appeal to your reason. It is a matter of history that during two or three centuries a continuous stream of thousands of men and women of every condition of life went from the great cities of the world to the Egyptian desert with the express purpose of meeting and overcoming the devils who, in various shapes, were believed to dwell in those dry places. Now if the belief had been unfounded would not the earlier comers have communicated with their friends at home and assured them of the uselessness of undertaking the journey? But apparently they never did, and so generation after generation passed to the desert, some of whom have left records of their strange experiences. If you doubt their statements, be it so, but you cannot escape the argument I have set out. But to resume our discourse, I wish to give a careful answer to the question you have propounded. In the first place we must distinguish between two kinds of spiritual influence, that which seems more proper to spirits—*i.e.*, an unseen influence on other spirits, and, in particular, on the spiritual part of man; the other the assumption of pure spirits for special purposes of some phantasms of bodily form. Which kind, Glaucus, shall we take first?

GLAUCUS. The latter, for if I could see a devil, as you say the hermits of the desert saw them, I should believe.

SOCRATES. Well said, Glaucus; and I shall ask you later in our discussion to remember your statement. Let us go back to what we said at the beginning, that from the earliest times a belief in the existence of evil spirits has been the common inheritance of mankind, and not only their existence but their manifestation in bodily shapes and their presence indicated by sensible phenomena. That belief, if I do not misunderstand you, has been only recently abandoned at the instance of modern scientific thought. Do you know on what grounds ?

GLAUCUS. Largely, I think, because they interfere with the uniformity of nature and the doctrine that known effects follow from known causes, the basis of all scientific discoveries.

SOCRATES. In other words, the problem of the universe is to be simplified in order that it may be understood. But these bodily manifestations do not interfere with the uniformity, but the wills do which are behind. For do we not see how profoundly human wills and the intelligences behind have affected nature and even changed the face of the earth ? It seems that the real objection is that all intelligent wills in the universe must be human, and by what arguments can this be maintained? *Quis sicut homo?* is a proud cry, but on what evidence does it rest ? Now I might produce continuous examples of bodily and sensible instances of evil down to the present day, though they would not convince those who on *a priori* grounds are incapable of conviction and are eager to put up with any intellectual absurdity to escape a supernatural conclusion. But I am prepared to accept for the purposes of our discussion that these manifestations have now wholly ceased. Shall we proceed on this assumption ?

GLAUCUS. If you please.

SOCRATES. Now if evil spirits exist their chief director must be a person of vast intellect and vast experience. In his warfare upon mankind he would act like a skilful general, sometimes he would deliver a frontal attack and sometimes proceed by concealment. If it be the case, which I fully concede, that the world has forgotten him, surely he would let so favourable condition persist ? If he were to appear in bodily shape the first result would be to bring Glaucus to his knees, Glaucus whom nothing but sight will convince. And if he were to appear in any of the great cities of the world in the terrible forms in which he appeared to Saint Anthony and the other hermits in the desert, the churches would be filled with worshippers. Do you not see that he who has been in all ages exceedingly crafty has in these times surpassed all his former efforts in that he has succeeded in persuading a considerable proportion of mankind, including my friend

Glaucus, that he does not exist? Are you prepared to teach the Devil tricks?

GLAUCUS. I have already said that if I were to see I should believe.

SOCRATES. Let us now take the other influence, that which is unseen. But may I ask you why you attach so much importance to sight when your scientific teachers seem to have largely abandoned it? For is it not true that in many branches they have gone beyond the power of sight and established truths wholly on inference?

GLAUCUS. That I admit is the case.

SOCRATES. Then shall we be in error if we apply the same method of inference to the existence of spiritual powers? As you will remember, I have constantly affirmed that I was led throughout life by a spiritual agency. Many things are said to happen to us "by chance." Is "chance" anything but a name for an effect which does not seem to follow from a cause? And is it reasonable and in accordance with our dignity as men that we should be at the mercy of things inanimate, beings with wills subordinate to what is without will? Again, are we not all conscious of times in our lives when we have schemed to accomplish some end, when there seems nothing in the way, and yet suddenly some force has arisen which has turned us aside from our path and thwarted our desires? And, to pass from our individual lives to that of nations, have you not heard of "catastrophic history," when totally unexpected events have happened, contrary to all anticipations and forecasts? Have not nations embarked upon great wars with definite objects in view, and have not the results, both to the victorious and the defeated, been very different from what they intended? The acts of individuals may be acts of free will, but what powers arrange the combinations which govern the final effects? Therefore, my Glaucus, I infer that in the universe there are intelligences superior to that of man and wills more powerful than our own. I approach with prayer and sacrifice the Divinity that rules the world that those spirits who serve Him in heaven may guard and defend us on earth, and that we may be delivered from those ever on the watch to harm our bodies and to assault and hurt our souls.

ATHELSTAN RILEY.

PASTORAL PROBLEMS AND THEOLOGICAL STUDY

II

5. *The Church.* (W.R. Syllabus, Nos. 9, 16.)

As the Body of Christ, the organism through which His Spirit acts and works, and carries on, extends and develops the work which He began during His Incarnate life, the Church deals with the practical affairs of daily life, the condition of the world as it is, and the pastoral care of those who, in response to the call of Jesus Christ, cease to follow the ideals and ways of the world and instead make Him their ideal and try to live their lives as He lived His. Once more, this claim of the Church is a very big claim, so that the "doctrine of the Church," which is the exposition and justification of this claim, is clearly a matter of great practical importance. The details of Church life, also, are so numerous and so complete that it is necessary to be clear as to the fundamental principles which underlie the existence of the Church so that her life and activities may be conducted on right lines and mistakes avoided.

Here are some questions which need to be answered before any practical undertaking can be begun, and the answers to them need to be taught to the members of the Church, together with the reasons for the views held:

What is the nature of the Church ?—*i.e.*, is it of either divine or human origin, or of both ?

Is the Church the ideal for all human society ?—*i.e.*, is it "Society in miniature" and therefore the standard and pattern for all social relationships ? for "social reform" ?

Should the Church dominate or "leaven" Society ?

What lessons and parallels are afforded by the Acts and Epistles for modern Church life ? social life ?

Has the Church at any time in the past faced the same or similar conditions or problems ? How far is that experience of value to us to-day ?

The following practical problems of internal life and management arise and can only be settled in the light and true understanding (*i.e.*, "doctrine") of what the Church is and what the Church exists for:

What are the conditions, obligations, and benefits of membership ?

How can Church members be trained in "Church sense" and loyalty and support of the Church's work ?

What are the respective rights, duties and relations between the ministry and the other members of the Church ?

How can discipline best be maintained and administered in a parish and congregation ?

Should there be a sub-committee of the Parochial Church Council to deal with lapses or offences by Church people ?

Is ex-communication possible or desirable ? How should it be inflicted ?

What is the ideal of the Parochial Church Council—*i.e.*, its claim, justification, *rationale*, authority, extent of its powers ?

What are the correct methods of Church government, organization, maintenance ?

What are the relations between Parish and Diocese and " National Church " and the whole " Catholic Church " ?

What is the right system and method of appointing clergy to their spheres of work—*i.e.*, of " patronage " ?

What is the place of a Cathedral Church ? And its constitution ?

What is the proper relation between town and country parishes ?

What are the right methods of missionary work, at home, in the Dominions, in countries under other governments, and among primitive peoples ?

What elements in the Church to-day need reforming, developing, improving ? How may this best be done ?

How can breaches of unity, " schism," be prevented ? and healed ?

What are the causes which lead to them ?

Problems of external relationship are:

What are the right relations between the Church and the civil power—*i.e.*, the " State " ?

How do these affect questions of marriage ? burial ?

Is the idea of a " National " Church sound ? What exactly does it mean in practice ?

What are the right relations between the Church and the existing " social order " ?

Should the Church, as such, play an active part in politics ?

What should be the action of the clergy and their people at election times ?

How should the Church behave in relation to special local conditions and peculiarities ?

How should the Church act in relation to other Christian communities ?

Should churchyards be at the disposal of all alike ?

Should non-Church people be married and buried with the rites of the Church ?

What are the ideal relations with Churches in other countries ? (*i.e.*, National Churches like Finland; and bodies like the Old Catholics).

How should marriage with foreigners be controlled ?

Is Intercommunion to be commended ? And the interchange of members ?

Is Reunion to be attempted ? and how ?

The Ministry.—One part of the problems of Church life is concerned with the ministry. The ministers exercise a fourfold office of Priest, Prophet, King and Wise Man—*i.e.*, they administer Sacraments and lead worship; they deliver God's message; they rule; and they are the consultants of those who need advice and help. This highly technical and responsible profession rests on a doctrinal and theological basis—*i.e.*, there would be no ministry but for the Church; no Church but for Jesus Christ; and no Christianity but for God. The ministry must therefore know why and for what it exists and be able to justify its claims and actions to the world.

The practical application lies as follows:

What is the purpose and function of a minister of the Church?

To what extent do the divine and the human elements respectively enter into the office ?

Is the traditional threefold ministry essential ?

Is Episcopacy of the *esse* or only of the *bene esse* of the Church ?

Should there be a permanent Diaconate ?

Should there be a woman Diaconate ?

Should there be a woman Priesthood and Episcopate ?

How far is a lay ministry possible ?

Is a diversity, specialization of function permissible ?

What are the functions and justification of Suffragan Bishops, Archdeacons, Canons, Rural Deans ?

Are Bishops *in partibus*, Cardinals, desirable ?

What is the place and status of " special service " clergy, and those in schools, universities, colleges, institutions, hospitals, the Services ? of religious " Orders " ?

Ought priests to act as secretaries of societies ?

May several appointments be held together ?

How may the ministry best be recruited and supplied ?

How may applicants best be tested ? trained ?

How may their training be continued after ordination, and for how long ?

How may clerical discipline be best exercised ?

Is a clerical dress, both in and out of church, to be commended ? What form should it take ?

What recreations are permissible to the clergy that are permissible to the laity ?

What should be the form of consecration ?

Could the Ordinal be improved ?

What should be the method of appointment ?

What should be the method of maintenance ?

May a minister divest himself of his " Orders " ?

May a minister be readmitted afterwards ?

6. *The Sacraments.* (W.R. Syllabus, No. 10.)

These are outward ceremonies or practices which are obligatory or customary with Church members, and it is asserted that through them certain inward, spiritual and moral powers are conveyed. The link with the foregoing " doctrines " is evident as follows: the reality or validity of the power asserted to be conveyed depends on whether the Church is a divine or merely a human institution; the divine element in the Church depends on the reality of the Holy Spirit, and on His being the Spirit of Christ; this depends on the reality and truth of the claim of Jesus to be the Son of God and the deliverer of man; and this on the reality and the nature of God Himself.

The practical, pastoral aspect of the Sacraments is obvious, but part of this aspect lies in the need to commend to people's reason the Church's practice and to appeal to their intelligence as well as to their feelings in order to secure the right use and full appreciation of the Sacramental life.

At the outset these general questions are involved:

What makes a Sacrament ?

What does the name " Sacrament " mean and why was it given ?

What is the place and purpose of the Sacraments in the Christian life ?

What is the general principle and idea of a Sacrament ?

Are there sacraments, or similar practices, in other sides of human life ? If so, what is the difference ? Or is there no difference ?

How do Sacraments work ? What gives the outward act its inward power or reality ? What makes a Sacrament ?

How many and what are they ?

On what does the obligation to use the Sacraments rest? Did our Lord really institute them? command their observance?

Did the Church institute them? If so, is there any difference between this and institution by Jesus Christ? (*i.e.*, does not institution by the Church as the Body of Christ and the organ of His Holy Spirit come to the same thing?).

Are they of universal obligation? indispensable?

Is the Society of Friends Christian, if they deny this obligation?

How is the parish priest to treat the non-communicant members of his congregation, and the infrequent communicant? Have they the same privileges and obligations as the communicant members?

What is needed to ensure validity?

Who should "administer" them? Should anybody, or any special persons?

Does the moral and spiritual fitness or unfitness of the "minister" affect their working?

What are the qualifications, requirements, obligations, benefits, for the individual? for the Church?

What safeguards are desirable or possible? How may they be enforced?

How can the idea of the *opus operatum* be corrected? superstitious use prevented?

What help does the past experience of the Church offer us to-day?

(*N.B.*—The above questions need to be answered in relation to each Sacrament separately.)

Passing from the general to the particular, to the two "Sacraments of the Gospel," these further practical problems arise:

Holy Baptism.—At what age should it be given? Are infants eligible? Can it be repeated? (A woman in Liverpool in 1904 had a sickly baby baptized successively by a Methodist minister, an Anglican priest, and a Roman priest, to help it get well. How can such superstitious misuse be prevented?)

Who may administer this Sacrament?

What are the essentials of the rite?

What are the customary forms and methods in use?

Have these always been the same?

Could any now disused be revived with advantage?

Could others be added?

Are local peculiarities found? Are they permissible?

May Holy Baptism be given at any time of the year, or is any season to be preferred ?

What are the best hours and occasions ?

Should it be given separately, or should the whole congregation be present ?

Do the peculiar conditions of town and country life respectively affect the time and method ?

Are godparents necessary ? or desirable ?

Are guilds of sponsors a help, to provide godparents for the children of strangers and newcomers ? Does this strengthen Church life in the parish ?

Who are eligible as godparents ?

Should the children of the careless and indifferent and evil be baptized ?

What happens hereafter to the unbaptized ?

What is the relation of Holy Baptism to Confirmation ?

What has the experience of the Church in the past and in other countries to teach us ?

Holy Communion : At what age may persons be admitted ?

May unbaptized persons be admitted ? Unconfirmed ?

Who may " celebrate " and " administer " this Sacrament ?

May a layman, a deaconess, assist with the Chalice ?

May lay people, when no priest is available as in distant places, conduct this service for themselves ? (*cf.* life of General Gordon).

What are the essentials of this rite ?

What are the customary forms and methods in use ?

Have these always been the same ?

Could any now disused be revived with advantage ?

Could others be added ?

Are local peculiarities found ? are they permissible ?

Is fasting essential ? desirable ?

Are " vestments " essential ? desirable ? Why ?

Is frequent or occasional communion right ?

May the Holy Communion be used with varying " intention " ?

What are the best times of day for it ? Is evening or afternoon communion permissible ?

Is a 9.15 celebration, followed by a Parish Breakfast, helpful ?

Could the " Agape " be reintroduced ?

Should the Holy Communion be regarded as the chief, central, and indispensable service ?

Can " spiritual communion " be made by anyone unable to go to church ?

How may the sick best "make their communion"? by a "private celebration"? by "Reservation"?
Is "Reservation" permissible? Under what conditions? for what purpose?
How can the corporate aspect be strengthened?

What has the experience of the Church in the past and in other countries to teach us?

7. *Prayer.* (W.R. Syllabus, No. 11.)

Prayer is the means of personal communication between man and God; in it both parties speak to each other. Again, it should be clear that of prayer, like any other activity, we must have a correct theory and understanding (we must know what we are doing and why, if it is to be effective); and we must know what God is like, and what we ought to be like, if we are to have personal relations and communication with Him.

If our approach to God and the possibility of having free and open communication with Him is the result of the at-one-ment ("at-wun-ment") made by Jesus Christ, it is desirable that we should realize and understand this.

So that these practical problems confront us:

Is the description of prayer just given a true description, full and adequate?

What is the aim and objective of prayer?

Is there more than one way of praying?
What are the respective advantages and values of the traditional methods (*i.e.*, Ignatian, Sulpician, etc.) and of ancient and modern prayers?
What is the difference between prayer and meditation?
How can prayer be taught? to children? to adults?
Is there a difference between congregational and private prayer?
What is the best form and method of intercession?
Are prayer groups valuable? How may they be begun and developed? What should be their size? Do they need a regular leader? How should prayer meetings be conducted?
Can the aged and infirm help in this?
What are the merits of vocal as against silent prayer?
Are "fellowships of silence" practical?
Should prayer be in general terms only, or should particular needs, etc., be mentioned?

What are the best times for private prayer? the best place? the best posture?

Are set prayers desirable? or should prayer be "free"?
What is the best method and time for "family prayers"?

What is the ideal for the priest's own prayer life?
What are the causes, explanations, remedies for the following difficulties:

Wandering thoughts—dryness of spirit—deadness of feeling—the non-receiving of things asked for?

What are the hindrances and the helps to prayer?

Some theoretical difficulties, which many feel as intensely practical:

If God knows what we need, why have we to ask Him?
Does God have to be persuaded to give us what is right?
Will God give me anything I ask for?
Isn't it wrong to try and change God's will?
How does prayer work?
What happens when two people pray for opposite things?
Isn't prayer purely subjective?

8. *Worship.*

Public worship is a custom of the Church and consists in the corporate offering to God of homage, praise, prayer, thanksgiving, confession and self-dedication. As with private prayer, we need a true belief in and knowledge of God and of ourselves if our worship is to be correct and complete. If God has made Himself known to us and given us deliverance through Jesus Christ and the Holy Spirit this should colour and receive adequate recognition in our worship. We have also a valuable though very voluminous guide in the knowledge of how past generations of Christians have worshipped. Belief in the Holy Spirit and the Church will help us to test traditional usages and past experiences and also to select and frame and adapt these to changed conditions when necessary. Incidentally, the Church's formularies teach us a great deal about what was believed and the doctrines held in the various parts of the Church and in past ages; *lex orandi* is *lex credendi.*

These fundamental questions present themselves:

What are the essentials and the purpose of worship?

Should the form of worship be fixed or variable (*i.e.*, the words, the ceremonies, the type of service)?

What are the respective uses and values of extempore prayer, collects, long prayers, litanies, biddings, periods of silence, music (instrumental and vocal)?

What is the value of art, colour, literature, symbolism, movement, ceremonial?

Do different kinds of congregations need different kinds of services ?

How best should services be arranged for children, for special occasions (*e.g.*, Armistice Day; Club "Walks"; the Oddfellows, Buffaloes, etc.; Church parades; the Mayor and Corporation; commemorations of the departed, etc.), dedications ?

What is the best arrangement and method of furnishing a church ?

What is the place of preaching in worship ?
- At what part of the service should it come ?
- What forms should the sermon take ?
- Is there more than one kind of sermon ?

Are local variations in methods of worship permissible ?
- At home ? in the mission field ?
- May "native" practices be utilized ?
- What principles should govern their choice and adaptation ?

How should the priest conduct worship (*i.e.*, style, manner, tone, pace) ?

How should the congregation take part ?

How can they be taught and trained to worship ?

Why is the "Daily Office" obligatory ?

How should the choir be chosen and composed ?
- Should they be paid ?
- Where should they sit in church ?
- Is a special dress desirable ?
- Where should the organ be placed ?
- Is an organ the best instrument ?
  - Should the old-time band be revived ?

9. *Moral Standards and Ideas.* (W.R. Syllabus, No. 12.)

To most people this is the most urgent problem of practical life to-day. Some are genuinely perplexed to know what is the right way of living, so many ways are possible. Others are concerned to preserve moral idealism which they see challenged on all sides and often ridiculed and ignored. All are faced sooner or later by the question, "What ought I to do, what is the right course in this case ?" and cannot easily answer it.

Christianity deliberately offers and requires a certain standard of life and conduct, and those who profess the Christian religion need to be taught what that standard is and how it is to be applied, and also how it is to be commended and justified to other people.

The need of a doctrinal, theological background is seen in the twin claim that Jesus Christ is the ideal man and also the source of moral power, for this claim needs the knowledge and explanation and justification of His Person and all that He did and taught. If He was not God He was *homo non bonus* and His claim falls to the ground as that of an impostor. If He was not God there is no guarantee of moral power through Him.

If the many problems of conduct, which no one can escape, are to be tested and solved by Christianity, we are aware at the outset that we need a clear knowledge and understanding of what the Christian moral standard is—*i.e.*, of the specific teaching of Jesus Christ as to conduct, individual and social; also of the principles which He laid down, and of the way in which the Church has applied those principles to circumstances as they have arisen. This means the study of the Gospels and the rest of the New Testament, of history and the Fathers, and the writers on "Moral Theology." A knowledge of the Old Testament teaching is necessary for a full understanding of the New, and to these must be added a comparison with the moral teaching and systems of ethics which man has worked out for himself—*e.g.*, moral ideas among primitive races and their more advanced descendants and their teachers, the Greek philosophers and dramatists; codes of law; the ethical teaching of other religions (see "Comparative Religion"). It will be necessary to distinguish between the two methods: one of which makes conduct a matter of detailed act, keeping rules and observing practices; while the other lays down principles and gives few detailed directions, but requires a man to decide the application for himself. The first of these is the legalist method and is seen largely in Judaism, Islam and Romanism; the second is that of Our Lord and the Catechism of the Church of England. The source of obligation should also be elucidated; is it the demand of authority requiring obedience, or love calling irresistibly for personal surrender?

The problems of conduct arise from the various relations in which man stands to his fellow man, and many of them are common to all races and ages: they centre mainly upon property, individual freedom, the family, the State.

E.g.: What are the necessary or desirable virtues in the individual? What is the make-up of the best man? Ought he to be brave, sober, controlled, just, patient, humble, assertive, pugnacious, truthful, industrious, careful over detail, quick, casual, honest, etc.?

How ought men to treat one another in the social order or community?

May a man own land, movable goods, money and capital, or should they be owned in common ?
May a man take and use what belongs to another ?
May a man take the life of another for any reason ?
May the community inflict " capital punishment " ?

May a man, or the community, restrain forcibly the action of another man ?
May everyone do as they like ?

What are the ideal relations between men and women ?
Ought marriage and sex-relations to be regulated ? and how ?
What is the ideal for family life ?

What are the duties and functions of a State ?
How should it act in relation to other States and peoples ?
Is racialism, nationalism, to be commended ?
May one community control another, as, *e.g.*, the control of a " child race " by a " civilized " people under a system of " mandates " ?
Is war permissible ?

These are all problems of a general nature, and there is an infinite number of moral problems of a particular detailed character which arise out of specific circumstances; these have to be decided by reference to the general principles which govern conduct as it falls under the four preceding headings, as laid down by the Christian standard and experience—*e.g.*:

Should a householder shoot at a burglar ?
May a starving man steal food for himself and for his family ?
May a doctor deceive a patient ?
Ought John to marry Mary ?
Is euthanasia right ?
How should a Christian act in a non-Christian community, etc. ?

10. *The Comparative Study of Religion.* (W.R. Syllabus, No. 13.)

This may at first sight seem to be one of the least practical of subjects; actually it touches the work of the parish priest at more points than he may be aware. It is notorious that there have been and still are a large number of religions, and comparison of these with Christianity is inevitable. The Christian claims that his religion is now the only religion—*i.e.*, that it is not only the best but that it has superseded all others that went before it, and that no other religion has yet arisen worthy to supersede it and never will. This twin claim will, of course, be contested, and the priest must be prepared to

defend it and to shew in what ways his faith is better than others and why nothing better can be produced. There is much that is common to religion in all ages and countries, and much care and skill are needed to see clearly the difference, *e.g.*, between the ideas of God, of worship, of prayer, etc., as found in Islam or Buddhism or Judaism and as taught by the Christian Church, and this means considerable study before the necessary knowledge can be acquired. It is not only in the mission field that this practical problem presses; at home we meet with people both educated and uneducated who have lived or travelled in " heathen " countries, and they are often puzzled by what they have seen and the similarity to their own religion. Critics and opponents of missions are fond of saying that God has given every people the religion best suited to it and that we ought not to interfere, and that if we do, we do harm and " spoil the native."

Other assertions which may be met are:

There are incarnations to be found in other religions. How do they bear on Christian belief ? How can you explain them?

" Of course, the Buddha was only Christ in another form."

" You find mystics in all religions, and mysticism is the only real religion, so that it doesn't matter what you belong to."

" Islam is a very inspiring faith."

" I became a Moslem because it is the only religion which practises universal brotherhood."

" Christianity took the best out of all the other religions and made itself out of them."

" All religions are equally true and you take your choice."

The problem meets us again in this way. There are certain big questions which everyone faces sooner or later, whether he is a thinker or the humblest of handworkers—*i.e.*: Is there a God ? What is He like ? Is the world a good world ? Why is there so much evil, suffering and wrongdoing ? Can it be removed and prevented ? What is the best sort of life to live ? What happens after death ? These are practical matters which have always exercised man, and all religions have had their answers and their recommendations. So that a man has a good many sources to help him, and the priest with his Christian Gospel should know the answers that have been given, especially as he will often find answers and beliefs that are not Christian though not consciously held as part of any other religion. He should know how each religion originated and developed; whether it is living and progressive or stagnant; how far it has met and can meet human need;

how far its teaching is true and complete; how both their origin, history and teaching compare with those of Christianity; and how they should be approached, controverted, corrected and supplemented.

(On this see W. Paton, *The Faiths of Mankind*; and D. A. Stewart, *The Place of Christianity among the Greater Religions of the World.*)

And once more, the number of survivals from primitive religion which still exist among us is very great. It is not only that the Church has itself preserved one or two officially, like details of the marriage and burial rites, and some unofficially, like hot cross buns and "clipping the Church," but in popular usage many things are done which would not be done if the doers had an intelligent and real belief in God as made known in Jesus Christ and the Holy Spirit. It is impossible for a Christian to believe in "luck"; in lucky and unlucky jewels and charms; to be afraid of beginning something on a Friday, or of the number thirteen, or of wearing green, or of bringing may into the house, or digging up parsley, or marrying in May; to think that the first child baptized in a new font will die within the year, or that the devil will get the soul of the first person buried in a new churchyard.

But these beliefs are rampant, just as people still throw salt over the left shoulder if they spill it and as horoscopes are still sold in country market places: a "sin eater" was reported not long ago; and they are all relics of pagan days, living forces now.

(For these see S. P. T. Prideaux, *Man and his Religion.*)

11. *Eschatology.*

"What is it all leading to?" "What happens after death?" "Does anything happen, or is death the end?" These are questions which everyone asks sometimes. There is a natural curiosity which is not limited to the "highbrow," and it is stimulated forcibly when someone dear to us is taken from us by a premature death. The young widow or widower, the parents of the child run over in the street, the young man whose friend is killed in the Alps, inevitably experience both wonder and perplexity. So that this matter, once more, is a most practical matter for the parish priest to consider; it is constantly coming under his notice. He will be continually in touch with people faced by it; he will meet answers and solutions which have come down by popular tradition from pre-Christian days (for all religions have had their teachings about the hereafter); and he is charged with teaching what Christianity offers for the guidance, help and comfort of mankind. This is a matter

which is definitely linked with and involves the practical application of the " doctrines " of God; of the Person and at-one-ing work of Our Lord, His Resurrection and Ascension; of the Holy Spirit, the Lifegiver; and of the Church and the Communion of Saints.

In the first place there is the question of individual survival of death. Some people are curious and wish to know whether they will survive; some are indifferent; some quite sure that they will not survive; some will hold the ancient notion that the individual survives only in his posterity or in the community; or that only moral and spiritual and æsthetic " values " survive. Others are curious about the body:

Is there a " resurrection body," and what is it like ?

What relation does it bear to this material body ?

If my body is perpetually changing and changes entirely every seven years, which of the many bodies which I have had shall I rise again with ?

If the body rises again, how ought it to be disposed of ?

Is cremation right ? Is it not interfering with God's ways ?

What happens to the bodies of people blown to pieces in an explosion ? or who have lost one or more limbs ?

Other questions likely to be met with are:

What happens immediately after death ?

And what after that ?

What are the people in the next world doing ?

Can they see us and know what we are doing ?

Can they help us ?

Ought we to pray for them ? Can they pray for us ?

Can we get in touch with the dead ? Is Spiritualism wrong ?

Is such communication desirable ? helpful ?

Have any such contacts been definitely established ?

Do the dead talk to us in our dreams ?

Shall we know and recognize each other hereafter ? be able to talk and enjoy one another's company ?

" I lost my first child as a baby: did he grow up in the next world, and shall I know him and he me ?"

Is there a " Heaven " ? What is it like ?

What are " Paradise " and " Purgatory " ?

Do people need to be " fortified by the rites of Holy Church " ? Against what ? whom ? What does the phrase mean ?

What sort of eschatology is implied by the Christian idea of God ?

Another set of practical problems and questions arise when the matter of right and wrong is remembered—*i.e.*, those which centre upon the idea of judgement. This has a definite link

with the Person of Our Lord as well as with His teaching, for both the Creed and the Te Deum call Him our Judge.

Few honest and intelligent people will deny that there must be a judgement; all demand it sooner or later for other people, even if they tacitly regard themselves as exempt. But there is much perplexity and uncertainty as to what form a last judgement will take; not everyone will feel that St. Matthew xxv. is to be taken literally. And St. John says (v. 24): "He that heareth My word, and believeth Him that sent Me, hath eternal life, and cometh not into judgement."

Further questions which arise under this thought are:

Is there "another chance" after death?

What happens at and after death to the evil, the careless, the morally good but religiously indifferent?

What happens to the saintly but imperfect?

What happens to the heathen, the pre-Christian?

What happens to the imbecile?

Will there be a compensation hereafter for those who had no chance or did not receive their deserts here?

Is there a "hell," and what is it like?

Will there be "everlasting punishment"? Is it not an immoral idea?

If Jesus will come "to be our Judge," how and when and where will He come? What will the "Last Judgement" be like?

St. John's Gospel says that the Holy Spirit is to come and "convict the world of sin"; is not this judgement? also that the Holy Spirit was to come in Jesus' place? Was not, therefore, Pentecost the "Second Coming"?

Is not Jesus, and/or the Holy Spirit, perpetually coming to us, in the Sacrament, in conscience, in spiritual experiences? If He said, "I am with you always"—how can He come again?

In the most direct pastoral way the question of eschatology bears as follows:

What happens hereafter and the certainty or otherwise of judgement must, or at least should, make a difference to men's way of living their lives here. So that the priest's teaching about the right way of living is inevitably governed by what he has to teach about the hereafter—*i.e.*, by his eschatology. It affects very closely his dealings with the sick and the dying—*i.e.*, should he tell the dying man that he is going soon "to pass into the immediate presence of the Most High"? or "into the hall of judgement"?

The question of the value of a deathbed repentance also arises, and of the best method of producing repentance in a man, well, sick or dying.

A serious and important matter is the choice of hymns, especially in Advent; some of these, and others used at Easter and at funerals, teach or at least imply ideas which are highly questionable and may lead people astray.

Equally important is the choice of prayers and devotions, and the use of the word "everlasting" where "eternal" is the more adequate and less misleading term.

Some ancient churches have the most lurid mediæval "dooms" represented on their walls. Historically they are most interesting; but what of their spiritual effect to-day?

S. P. T. Prideaux.

THE PROBLEM OF EVIL: ITS VALUE FOR THEOLOGY*

It is not common to think of a problem in terms of value, but rather as something to be escaped from, or at best as something which calls for a quick solution. We cannot, however, escape from the problem of evil, nor can we claim that it has been solved—and the theologian will be wise to ask the significance of this failure. The value of the problem for him lies in the challenge of its unresolved paradox. Whether we consider the nature, the origin or the conquest of evil, we are faced with paradox. We are forced to seek a connexion between physical and moral evil, but experience refuses to identify them. There is paradox in the recognition of an evil inheritance together with a sense of individual responsibility for sin. Thirdly, there is, for those who accept the Christian Revelation, faith in a victory which has overcome the world of sin, and the fact, on the other hand, of the continual existence of evil.

There are three possible ways of approach to the problems thus raised—the way of history, of philosophy and of myth. We may examine the theories of the past (those for instance of Origen, Augustine or Gregory of Nyssa) and ask how far they do justice to the facts of Christian experience—whether they resolve or merely preserve the paradox. We may, as philosophers, seek an independent solution, either by way of *a priori* reasoning or of induction from the accepted results of scientific investigation. Or we may appeal to the myth of Revelation.

Myth is a word which requires explanation. It is interesting

* A Paper read to a theological group of the Anglo-Russian Fellowship, June 14, 1937.

to note that two writers so different as Niebuhr and Berdyaev have found it necessary to make use of this term in their interpretation respectively of ethics and history. It does not, of course, imply the opposite of objective, historical fact. It deals, says Niebuhr, "with vertical aspects of reality which transcend the horizontal relationships which science analyzes, charts and records. The classical myth refers to the transcendent source and end of existence without abstracting it from existence."* Myth then emerges at the point where two worlds meet. It speaks of a Transcendent God who is also active in history. For this reason we should expect to find that myth is a characteristic of the Biblical Revelation and that it is incapable of purely rational explanation. The test of its truth will be in life and not in logic. This is not, of course, to say that myth lies outside the realm of historical and rational argument. The myths, for instance, of Creation and the Fall come to us through human channels, and we cannot ignore the force of historical circumstance and psychological peculiarity in their creation. Moreover, if faith is not bare credulity, there must be tests for the validity of myth: we are bound to consider its relationship to the rest of human thought and experience. But historical analysis and philosophical speculation cannot solve the problem of evil, and their chief significance is that they point beyond themselves to the way of myth. We reach again the paradox of Revelation in the recognition that while myth must be brought to the test of history and reason, history and philosophy themselves are under its judgement.

History reveals no solution. However near individual writers may seem to come to a solution, the illegitimacy of their procedure (the treating of the Adam story, for instance, as the historical starting-point for theories of transmitted guilt), the correction of their emphasis by later movements of thought, the continued use of mythological language, make it clear that the problem for the Church as a whole was not solved. The constant factors of Christian experience—a sense of victory and of the reality of evil, recognition of the corporate nature of sin and of individual responsibility—remain a paradox. And the failure to resolve this paradox we must explain as due to historical circumstance or to a lack of knowledge (which our own fuller knowledge of science or insight into truth may correct), or as revealing the essential nature of Christian experience, and pointing to the Scriptural Revelation as that from which it derives its significance. In other words, we are thrown back from history to philosophy—or to myth.

* Niebuhr, *An Interpretation of the Christian Ethic*, p. 36.

Philosophy has given many answers to the problem—so many as to make them suspect—but it can only resolve the paradox of Christian experience by denying one side of it. The denial, for instance, of the reality of guilt by the assertion that evil is only a stage in a dialectical process, a means of good, reveals the impossibility of *a priori* solutions, so soon as they are tested (as von Hügel bids us test every doctrine) by their fruitfulness in life. The inductive philosopher, too, is precluded by the very limitations of his method from claiming finality, for there is truth in the statement that in philosophy "deduction has no right to its starting-point and induction no right to its conclusion."* The inductive philosopher can give reasons for the improbability of the truth of Christian experience, he cannot disprove it. The philosopher, in fact, suffers from the same limitation as the psychologist, who cannot exhaust the mystery of the human mind since he himself can only bring a human mind to bear on his subject. He is part of the order of things which he seeks to explain in logical terms. He remains a man.

When we turn to the Judaic-Christian Myth we find that, so far from attempting to resolve the paradox, it underlines and intensifies it. The Myth is given in the Prophetic Revelation and in the Incarnation. It is mediated through Scripture and experienced in the Church. Scripture itself, of course, is not independent of historical circumstance. Even some of the cruder theories of the Fall, for instance, find a place on the periphery of the New Testament: the writers were children of their age. Moreover, Scripture has still to be interpreted, and there is room here for human fallibility. And yet the task rests on the theologian to ask whether there is not in the diversity of the Biblical writings an essential unity, and if there is such a unity, what is the significance of its message. This task has come to be recognized in present-day New Testament study. The New Testament, however, is rooted in the Old: it is there that we have to seek the origin of its approach to evil. And in the Old Testament, whatever variations we may find in its attempts to deal with evil as a problem, there are certain governing conceptions which we may call the Prophetic Mythology. It centres round the myths of Creation and the Fall. Nature reveals the Creator God (the heavens declare His glory); but Nature is in disorder—not until the Messianic Age will the wolf lie down with the lamb and all Nature be restored. Man is made in God's image; but man is a sinner. The strongest corporate sense in the Prophets is combined with the plainest statement of individual

* *Cf.* Temple, *Nature, Man and God*, p. 90.

responsibility. God is the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, the Lord of History; and yet He is the Transcendent God, a God who hideth Himself. He governs the affairs of men and nations—and yet the Day of the Lord is to come.

This Mythology, the myths of Creation and the Fall, of a Transcendent-Active God, gives a distinctive tone to Hebrew religion. We find here no easy solutions. There is no attempt to explain away evil as illusion—sin and suffering are real. On the other hand, there is no ultimate dualism—for despite the evil of the world, the victory of God lies ahead and will be manifested on earth. Evil, though God may turn it to good account, is not treated as necessary for the production of good. Nor is there a simple identification of evil with the flesh: Judaism knows no Demiurge.

The New Testament inherits this Mythology. Its distinctiveness, however, lies here: it adds to the Prophetic Mythology the fulfilment of the Prophetic Hope. Its message is the coming of the Kingdom. It has little to say (except implicitly) of the nature and origin of evil, but it is full of the assertion of victory. It does not treat evil so much as a problem as something to be conquered. God is still the God of Israel and His sovereignty is manifested in Nature, but now He has come to establish His reign over men. This, then, is the day of "realized eschatology": the Day of the Lord has come. The victory over the powers of evil is manifested in the signs of Jesus. He releases in His healings those whom Satan has bound. He casts out demons by the finger of God, and points to this as a sign that the Kingdom of God has "come upon" men. Suffering is everywhere treated as evil, a mark of Satan's power, its removal a casting down of his strongholds. Suffering and sin are connected and men are released from both alike: the paralytic receives forgiveness of sins. But there is no suggestion as to what the connexion is: on one occasion, according to the Fourth Gospel, Jesus expressly denies that suffering is the direct result of sin. This theme of realized eschatology dominates the whole New Testament. The Church knows the meaning of victory—the victory that overcometh the world. The note of triumph sounds most clearly in the Fourth Gospel, where we find that the Eschaton has entered history in the present reality of Judgement and the Resurrection, and in the "coming again" of the Lord to the Church through the Spirit. The Church, again, according to St. Paul, is the New Israel, the People of God, the faithful Remnant of Prophecy—the sphere of God's sovereignty and the conquest of evil.

But just as the New Testament fulfils the prophetic hope, so it increases the tension in the Prophetic Myth. There the

Transcendent God is the Lord of History: here the Lord of History enters history—and suffers as Man. If the Incarnation brings God into human life, the Cross reveals the gulf that separates man from God. Moreover, the victory of God is won —through death. The Gospel story in Mark which begins with the conquest of the demons moves on to the Cross. From the ninth chapter onwards we hear no more of Exorcism and very little of healings: the recurring theme is δεῖ παθεῖν. And the pain of the Cross is real, the desolation complete. Jesus dies alone and they bury His "corpse." But the immediate result is the unexplained one, the conversion of the centurion, the firstfruits of the Gentile world. St. John rightly interprets the Cross as Victory. St. Paul sees in it the overthrow of the principalities and powers. But the victory of God was a paradox—victory through self-emptying. And only those who shared the death could know the triumph. The Church was the Body of those who had died and risen with Christ. Their risen life was a dying life—in contrast to the living death of the world. In their victorious life they had still to remember that they were men, living "in flesh": life remained a warfare against the powers of evil. For though these powers had been broken, the end was not yet. There remained a "futurist eschatology," a looking forward, a "not yet" as well as a "now." Christians could never imagine that their victory was a personal achievement so long as they continued to wait for the "Day." This crossing of futurist and realized eschatology, this Now and Not Yet, controls the whole Christian life and reveals its inner tension. It is found in the glad acceptance of suffering and its transformation into a means of grace, though it remains a thing of evil. It is found in the life of prayer, for as men grow in holiness, in nearness to God, they know themselves to be the "chief of sinners"—and this is not the morbid exaggeration of the "twice born," but the paradox of saints. It is found in the life of fellowship: for the very life of the redeemed society brings a man to the place where he stands alone before God. It is found in the challenge of the transcendent ethic to men who live in a world of relative values. It is found in worship, where every Eucharist makes known the Presence of the Lord and says at the same time "till He come." It was in this tension that men found the meaning of death to self and the reality of life in Christ. In this was victory.

The value of the problem of evil is to remind theology of its true starting-point. History and philosophy—the analysis of human experience and the synthesis of human knowledge —seek to resolve the paradox of evil: their failure points

beyond themselves to the Prophetic Myth, the Eschaton in history. Their work is only of value when, in the light of this, they recognize their limitations. Prophetic Myth solves no riddles, and Christian Revelation rather serves to increase the intellectual tension. "So far from solving the enigmas," it has been said, "faith has only begun to see what they are." Myth, then, is not the admission of despair, nor does it countenance intellectual laziness: it is the only final form in which we can express ourselves where Eternity touches Time, where Transcendent and Relative meet, and God speaks to Man. To recognize this no doubt requires an act of faith in the God of Revelation. But to accept it is the highest wisdom of the intellect. And the test of its truth is in life—in the continued experience of victory.

It only needs to be added that this experience itself involves tension—a dying to live which is more than an intellectual paradox. The task of the Church is to shew to a world which is beginning to recognize the fact of evil the way of conquest. But this it can only do if it responds to the double challenge—to verify the Christian Myth in experience, and to bring that experience continually under its judgement.

W. S. T. Wright.

DE DECANIS RURALIBUS
(CHIEFLY AN APPRECIATION)

When William Dansey the Rector of Donhead St. Mary was requested by the Bishop of Salisbury to accept the office of Rural Dean of Chalke, Wiltshire, in 1825, he naturally wished to know something of what the office meant. It was then a modern revival of a very ancient duty that Bishops were making in some Dioceses, and many more Diocesans would presently be following the lead of the pioneers. It was soon to be discovered that the Rural Deans were an invaluable aid to the Archdeacons in such matters as obtaining repairs and improvements to Vicarage houses, with their appurtenances of barns and stabling, and to churches which were commonly in a state of dilapidation. It was to be discovered that where Rural Deans were revived there frequently followed an improvement in the fellowship of the clergy, and a higher standard of clerical life and learning. Testimony of this kind from the Bishops is on record. But when William Dansey was requested by his "Venerable Diocesan" to accept the appointment of Rural Dean of Chalke the revival was in its

early stage. England, indeed, was engaged in reforming itself in many directions. In 1832 came Poor Law Reform, the first since Queen Elizabeth, and the Parish Poor House, a ghastly place, passed into the "Union House" of many combined parishes. In 1833 came the Reform Bill, the death of the Rotten Boroughs, the new voice of the people, and the rise of the manufacturing middle class. In 1833 came the first Factory Reform Bill, which reformed or at least aimed at reforming child life and labour. In 1833 came Keble's Sermon and the Oxford Movement to alter the religious expression of a large portion of the people. In 1833 came the Emancipation Act to end slavery under the British flag, and in 1836 came the Ecclesiastical Commission to reform Church endowments, and prove itself an economic blessing to the Church. There seems to have been "Revival" in the air, and "Re-formation" in the very bones and marrow of the people. The revival of Rural Deans was part and parcel of the same wide movement. These were days when men had ideas, and vision was open. Nevertheless they were also days that our present age has as much blame for as praise. Towns were growing up without planning, for example, and slums were being created for the future to destroy.

But to return to "Rural Deans." William Dansey felt that the more he knew about the office the better Rural Dean he might make, at least it seemed to him a first step to get to know something of "the origin, appointment and functions of Rural Deans." But he found that though he might have a thirst there were no means of slaking it. He would be forced *Integros accedere fontes atque haurire*—in a word there were no books on the subject. He might ask questions, but there was none to answer them. If he was to know he would have to go to original sources; to dig for the springs.

Strangely enough, Dansey came upon a little tract in manuscript on this very subject. It was written in 1667 A.D. by Dr. John Priaulx and was an address to the clergy of the Decanate of Chalke on his appointment to the charge of Rural Dean by Bishop Seth Ward. This little tract was printed by Dansey with a memoir of the author in 1832, and I have no doubt it served to quicken his interest in the matter, for in 1835 appeared the first edition of Dansey's great work in two volumes entitled *Horæ Decanicæ Rurales*. It was published again in a second edition by Messrs. Rivington in 1844, and it is pleasant to note that William Dansey, whose modesty as well as his learning appears so frequently in his words, is now Prebendary of Salisbury as well as the Rural Dean of Chalke.

I have no doubt that Dansey's researches required not only ability and a kind of natural habit, but also hard cash, and it

is possible that though his head was well furnished his pockets may have been less so. However that may have been, Dansey was in many respects a man of nice honour, for as years went by and it became evident that there might be some money profits from his work the question rose to his mind, " What was he to do with such gain ?" Indeed, " how far did his own right reach ?" Had he not asked a multitude of people a multitude of questions, and some of their replies were woven into the book, which was consequently theirs as well as his ? Had he not searched many libraries ? The Archbishop himself had opened Lambeth to him, though to be sure he had never got there. The roads were difficult, and there were expenses of travel. He had bought books of a rare sort after much search and enquiry. Morisan's *Diatriba de Protopapis* he heard of and bought at Ghent, for example, though he laments never to have seen Zeltner's *Tractatus de Periodentis*, and Schmidt's *Dissertatio de Synodis*, they had to remain *opuscula desiderata.*

There was much in his volumes from other sources, though he had searched them out; what would he have done without Whitaker's *Histories of Manchester and Richmondshire*, White-Kennett's *Parochial Antiquities*, Wilkins' *Concilia Regni Anglici et Hibernici*, for example, and many others ? So, if his own volumes brought profits, to whom would they belong ? He had a nice scruple, and he finally decided to give such profits as now appeared on a somewhat distant horizon to " The National School " now on the eve of being established in his parish " for the religious education of the children of the poor, to breed them up in the nurture and admonition of the Lord."

It may be that Dansey's delicate balance of conscience and conduct will be less admired by the modern reader when he comes to exhibit it in another direction, for all his copious quotations from early Councils remain in their original Latin, or in the less frequent Greek and French. The very thought of giving the English renderings involves Dansey in a scruple. Would it not suggest a distrust of the scholarship of Rural Deans ? and if so, would he not be doing something to the dishonour of those whom he so highly regards ? Alas ! many a fine book of other days continues sealed to all but a few, for the days of Mr. Page and the Loeb volumes were not yet.

One exception Dansey makes. Where Russian occasionally occurs the English equivalent rendering is given—after all there are limits ! In the case of Latin, Greek, or French he assumes in his Rural Deans and others an adequate knowledge both of classical and mediæval forms, but Russian they may be excused, and not a breath upon their scholarship.

* * * * *

Standing in Chichester Cathedral recently my eye rested upon this epitaph to

> William Otter D.D., Bishop of Chichester and formerly fellow of Jesus College, Cambridge, October 1836, of whom it was said
>
> "He restored the Rural Chapters to their ancient use."

So it was in many a diocese about that time. According to the Bishops' Act Book in our York Registry the Archbishop appointed, twelve Rural Deans, a round dozen, on one and the same day, November 1, 1841.

The revival of an ancient office, that had become decayed even before the period of the Reformation, was taking place in the early years of the nineteenth century.

Undoubtedly when Rural Deans either ceased to be appointed, or continued only as pale shadows of their former selves, they were missed men. Not men who were swept away, they and their offices to the tune of "a good riddance," but men whose work was missed, and whose absence was regretted.

Their districts remained as divisions of an Archdeaconry, the Deaneries were known by name, but the men were not in them. Their work was undone, their influence was removed. Here and there a pale ghost moved, but that was all, except in a few places such as the Channel Islands, Norwich, and about Carlisle.

Henry the Eighth in his *Reformatio legum Ecclesiasticarum* felt their loss and sought to restore them, but it came to nothing. Convocation in 1710 sought to bring them back again, under the express desire of Queen Anne, but Convocation talked itself out, the discussion became pedantic, academic, though never uninteresting, and finally managed to choke itself over a multitude of debatable points. So it remained, until a mighty stirring came about a hundred years ago, and it seemed that God blessed their re-appearance, at least there is the contemporary evidence of several Bishops to show it.

It may be that the clergy generally as well as the Rural Deans discern that the Rural Chapter and the general or public opinion of the clergy there expressed is a helpful instrument making for good discipline, activity, and fellowship among the brethren. The modern office of Rural Dean is in many respects fashioned upon the ancient model, and the Church of today is more inclined to turn to the Rural Chapter and improve it than to turn away from it and discard it.

To those of the brethren who feel that they would be the better for knowing more of this office, and reading of its ancient

uses perceive the possibilities of its modern revival, may I respectfully introduce them to William Dansey? He may be found, perhaps rarely disturbed, in such places as University Libraries and in those belonging to Cathedral bodies.

In his company may possibly be found White-Kennett and his *Parochial Antiquities*, 1695, Dr. Atterbury's address to the Archdeaconry of Totnes, 1708, the *Records of the Northern Convocation*, Surtees Society, 1906, and it might perhaps be added et cetera, et cetera ! !

A. Earle.

MISCELLANEA

THE GODHEAD OF CHRIST

Christ was perfect God and perfect man. While on earth He would not use more power than appertains to man. He was perfect man, not supernatural man. When He came to earth He limited His Godhead, otherwise He would not have been perfect man.

True He did miracles—particularly healing—Man also sometimes has apparently supernatural power. Some men have the power of healing, either by their touch or their presence. This may be a power latent in Mankind, or a particular gift of the Holy Spirit. Whichever is the cause, Christ, as perfect man, would have used all the power which belongs to man, and the Power of the Holy Spirit.

Perfect man must be continually conscious of God's prevailing presence—even sinful man sometimes feels an awareness of some presence outside himself, urging, restraining, or suddenly enlightening him.

The perfection of human endeavour is sacrifice. The voluntary giving up by man, of his own wishes and ways; the guiding of his life to be of service to others. Man finds this difficult; thoughts and care for self continually intrude; man sees himself through the eye of the world, not through the eye of God.

The one perfect man said of Himself, " I am among you as one that serveth." And the end of that service was the supreme sacrifice on the Cross.

This sacrifice could not be avoided, for it is the sin in the world that makes any sacrifice necessary. His was the " full, perfect and sufficient sacrifice, oblation and satisfaction, for the sins of the whole world."

That sacrifice was necessary to shew us that the only way of conquering sin is by living the absolutely unselfish life. Shewing mastery over ourselves, by the conquest of selfish and worldly thoughts and actions, in the service of Him " whose service is perfect freedom."

When on the Cross Christ's natural body had died, as all natural bodies must die, the limited human power was finished and Christ by the limitless power of His Godhead was able to raise the natural human body in a supernatural way.

The glory of the resurrection could not have come to pass without the death of the human body.

The perfection of manhood by the entire elimination of self, through the willing sacrifice of the life to which mortal nature clings, was necessary to shew the Perfect Man who came to be, not only a sacrifice for sin, but also an example of a godly life.

The death on the Cross was the perfect sacrifice of His manhood. The resurrection of the body is the perfect proof of His Godhead. Both necessary to teach sinful man the Way.

Elizabeth Ellwood.

THE MATTHEAN "EXCEPTION"

While well aware that I am questioning an ingrained tradition, I feel bound to urge that the passage referring to Divorce in the First Gospel, Matt. xix. 3-12, forms a united whole, and should be treated as such. Whether the phrase "except for fornication," and the passage about eunuchs, were inserted into an original document, does not concern me at the moment. As it now stands, the passage in its entirety has a logical and natural sequence. For, after all, the passage about eunuchs need not be taken as an irrelevant and discordant contention in favour of celibacy, but a forcible re-iteration of the idea of perfect chastity already implied in the earlier use of the wide word Fornication, where the narrower word Adultery might have been expected, as perhaps it was. Both this choice of a word, and the phrases about absolute continence, set a high standard, indeed, though after all even this is only a step towards the terrific standard set in a passage which occurs earlier (Matt. v. 27), where it is stated that anyone who gazes on a woman in order to arouse his desires has already committed adultery with her in his mind.

It is to be noted that in the passage just mentioned "has committed adultery" is used in its strict sense, since the object is γυναῖκα, a married woman. And though it is fashionable to sweep the very idea aside, we ought to consider whether it is not possible, or even probable, that in Matt. xix. Porneia is used in its strict sense, so that the words would mean what they say, "Whosoever shall put his wife away, except for fornication." It is possible for Porneia to be used in the sense of Adultery. But actual examples are very rare. The only indubitable case in the New Testament is 1 Thess. iv. 3 (which, oddly, is overlooked in Abbot-Smith). Weight must also be given to the clear case in Pastor Hermas *Mand.* iv. 5. The two other instances which are quoted are 1 Cor. v. 1, and, from the Old Testament, Amos vii. 17. But in the last two cases there is good reason why a more generic term than Adultery should be used. Such a term was needed on occasion, and Porneia was so used. But even that fact should put us on our guard against using it in a more restricted sense than it usually bears. But its obvious meaning is Fornication, and unless the context settles it otherwise, it must be so taken. If, as we have said, the passage be taken as a whole, leading into the final words about continency, there would be a prima facie case for taking the word to mean Fornication, at least inclusively. The rendering Adultery seems only to be necessary if we take that verse separately—a kind of procedure against which there is a growing revolt.

There is no need to treat the passage as a collection of scraps with no ruling idea. Each section of it leads into the next and on to the others. Our Lord is asked whether marriage can be dissolved. In His usual way, He throws His questioners back on first principles. He compels them to face the question, What is marriage? He points out that the essential feature of marriage, as created by God, is the relation between male and female. That relation, the moment it is established, has such profound psychological effects that it overrides and supersedes all other social ties. For the very act makes them one organism. So He lays down that, since this state of union is created by God, it cannot be undone by any desire of man. Faced by the plain fact in human nature, which He brought out, the Pharisees adduce the permission given by Moses, the Man of God, to escape from any difficult situation by the execution of a

deed. Our Lord treats this as being merely a way to make the best of a bad business. But, as concerning the principle, instead of retracting it, He emphasizes it, by refusing to sanction any reason for putting a wife away except fornication. That is quite logical. On the principle laid down, previous intercourse would render the marriage void, because the woman had already been united to another. The disciples, seeing the obvious implication, say, If the man comes under the same ruling as the woman then he has no right to marry. (That is to say, any previous fornication on his part prevents his taking another woman as his wife.) He answers—and it is an answer—that though no place is left for the acceptance of the standard in the lives of many, yet there is such a place in the lives of those who have been given power to abstain. These are not so few as men suppose. Some are continent by nature, just as some have had continence imposed on them, and, besides, there are those who have restrained themselves, or been oblivious to temptation, for the sake of the Kingdom of Heaven. Then, in absolute and perfect continuity with all that He has said, He concludes with " Let those who are in this position be careful to retain it."

It will be noticed that this treatment brings the remark of the disciples into line. The accustomed interpretation, as given by Allen, is, " If the cause or reason of divorce between man and wife be so, *i.e.* if it is to be limited to unchaste acts, it is better not to marry, because marriage with a woman of bad temper or malicious tongue, *e.g.*, is in that case an intolerable burden which cannot be thrown off." This is something like going off on a side-issue, and, in any case, it is hard to imagine the disciples taking so cynical and calculating a view. But it is not unnatural that they should unthinkingly take the view, common at all times, that the generality of man cannot be expected to be continent, and indeed are not, in their bachelorhood. It may be added that it is often assumed that His disciples were astonished at this saying, and it may be so, though the text can only be said, at most, to imply it. But if the rule laid down were merely that Adultery was a ground of divorce, they would scarcely be astonished at an opinion held by so many at the time.

With regard to the view of marriage among the Early Christians, it is interesting to note what is laid down in Ignatius' Epistle to Polycarp v. 2: *πρέπει δὲ τοῖς γαμοῦσι καὶ ταῖς γαμουμέναις μετὰ γνώμης τοῦ ἐπισκόπου τὴν ἕνωσιν ποιεῖσθαι, ἵνα ὁ γάμος ᾖ κατὰ κύριον καὶ μὴ κατ' ἐπιθυμίαν.* This Kirsopp Lake translates by: " But it is right for men who marry to be united with the consent of the bishop, that the marriage be according to the Lord and not according to lust." It might, perhaps, be rendered better: " It is fitting for those who marry to effect their mutual union with the consent of the bishop, that the marriage be after God's fashion and not a mere result of desire." However, the physical action of the parties seems to be taken as the fundamental matter. Indeed, the official view of all Christendom that a marriage without it is null, points in the same direction. This has become obscured because of the keenness with which other matters are debated, but it remains true.

This view of the matter, arising naturally, as it seems to me, from the passage in St. Matthew, does not harmonize with the positions taken up by the protagonists on either side of the present controversy. For many of the critics of the present law assume that the sexual act is of little importance, and has no permanent effect. This dangerous tendency has not been brought into the degree of notice and under the weight of

criticism which it deserves. If it were, the common knowledge of mankind would condemn it.

On the other hand, it seems necessary to revise—or rather enlarge—the much-quoted dictum of the bishops. They "affirm as our Lord's principle and standard of marriage a life-long and indissoluble union for better or worse of one man and one woman, to the exclusion of all others on either side." The question of the virginity of the parties is begged. But, on the above shewing, it ought not to be. No one, I imagine, would deny that the Christian ideal of marriage is the indissoluble union of virgins, and that we must uphold it. But to insist on it is so different a matter that the Church has not attempted to enforce an important part of it. We do not as a matter of practice refuse Communion to those who have fallen below our Lord's standard in respect of virginity. We demand that other intercourse should be repented of, and cease. But that does not undo the lasting effects. Moreover, without any opprobrium, the rule of virginity has always been released, on the death of one party. It would therefore seem legitimate to enquire whether provision cannot be made with regard to the second half of the ideal. Any provision about that, as our Lord made clear, would be a concession to stupidity, if not savagery. But He gave a reason for it. It is a reason which indeed must be very unwelcome to those who are dealt with under it. But it is a reason and not a prohibition. Our Lord is not reported as saying that Moses was wrong, and we have no right to insert in the text, as many do, what is not there.

R. O. P. Taylor.

THE UNJUST STEWARD

If we concede that our Lord occasionally used irony to force home His point, the parable of the Unjust Steward presents no difficulties. The story can be told in modern language in some such way as this: A wealthy merchant had a managing clerk who was negligent in his business methods. He had allowed certain customers to get behind with their payments. The merchant had an interview with his clerk and discharged him from the business. But before his departure from the office the clerk was ordered to put the accounts in order and collect arrears.

The clerk was overwhelmed by his misfortune because he was too old to work on the land and too proud to beg. He thinks over his plight and is struck by a bright idea. He decides to curry favour with the customers because, if he does so, they will offer him hospitality when he is without means. So he calls some who owe the firm goods. One customer admits that he owes a hundred measures of oil. He is told to sit down *quickly*—there is no time to be lost—and make it fifty. And so with at least one other client. These unrighteous business people obtain benefits and become under an obligation to the managing clerk. No doubt they will be very useful to him afterwards. This man was a very astute fellow.

At this point the merchant comes back into the story. He hears of the further duplicity of his clerk, and, being a shrewd business man himself, he commends the cleverness of his subordinate. "You're a devil," he says, "but a mighty clever devil." Such sentiments are not unknown in the twentieth century. And such dishonest people are

wise *in their generation—i.e.*, for the time being. From a purely worldly point of view it is often advantageous to be crooked. The children of this world *are*, for the time being, wiser than the sons of light.

And now our Lord makes His comment. He is probably telling the story to the crowd, and there is a twinkle in the divine eye. Looking humorously at the men round Him, He says: "Do the same thing. Make friends with the unscrupulous people of the time. The man in the story gained hospitality by being crooked. Do the same thing that they may provide you with everlasting habitations."

This kind of remark is also made in the twentieth century. "Drink yourself to poverty, my boy, and the brewer will keep you." Or, "Squander all you've got on the race course, and the bookmaker will look after you."

Our Lord surely used the same kind of irony as the modern father, but we, because of a certain stolidness of mind, refuse to agree, and we miss the point of the story.

T. P. Stevens.

THE GATES OF HADES

To Dr. Badcock's references should be added the following:

Wisd. i. 14: "Nor hath Hades royal dominion (*βασίλειον*) on earth."

Test. Levi iv. 1: "Hades taketh spoils through the visitations of the Most High."

4 Ezra viii. 53: "Hades is fled away."

2 Baruch xxi. 23: "Let Sheol be sealed so that from this time forward it may not receive the dead, and let the treasuries of souls restore those which are enclosed in them." Charles, *in loc.*, says, "To these chambers only the righteous were admitted," and compares 4 Ezra iv. 35, 41; vii. 101, 32.

Enoch li. 1: "Sheol also shall give back that which it has received."

Enoch lvi. 8: "In those days . . . Sheol shall devour the sinners in the presence of the elect."

Enoch xcix. 11: "Woe to you who spread evil to your neighbours; for you shall be slain in Sheol."

Ps. Sol. xiv. 6: "Their inheritance is Sheol and darkness and destruction" (*cf.* xv. 11).

The non-canonical Jewish writings are essential to a full understanding of the New Testament, and they are often ignored. One or two of the passages just quoted definitely connect Sheol-Hades both with sin and with destruction, so that it could be argued that Sheol-Hades represents the powers of evil. Dr. Charles on Enoch lxiii. 10 has shewn how the meaning of Sheol changed in the period between the Old and the New Testament.

Is it necessary to be quite so logical, especially in dealing with an Eastern writing, and to argue that because the Church as the Body of Christ is immortal, therefore "it" cannot be the Church? The Church includes men and women who are subject to death, but because they are in the Church death has no power over them, so that death and/or the powers of evil cannot prevail against the Church.

S. P. T. Prideaux.

Dr. Badcock's interesting excursus on the latter part of Matt. xvi. 18 (" the gates of Hades shall not prevail against it ") in your July issue has just met my eye, and elicits my thanks, because the usually accepted interpretation of the passage, which would make it merely a promise or prophecy of the indestructibility of the Church on Earth, seems inadequate and probably misleading, misrepresenting both Hades and the functions of gates.

But I do not agree with Dr. Badcock that " the only interpretation left is a prophecy of a resurrection," though such a prophecy would certainly seem to be included. Particularly I take exception to his statement that " the Church . . . has no jurisdiction in Hades except—if this can be called an exercise of jurisdiction at all—by way of prayer."

Let it be granted that Hades in the New Testament means the place or state of the disembodied soul, in which the soul may be in any condition ranging from happiness to suffering, also that αὐτῆς refers to the Church.

Gates must either give or resist entrance or exit. They can be said to " prevail " only when successfully repelling assault either from without or within. No assault would be necessary to the disembodied human soul, ordinarily to some extent at least sin-laden, on its arrival before them. But when the sinless soul of the Head of the Church, in its triumphant progress of conquest over death, bearing the Gospel of Salvation to the souls of the Old Dispensation, approached those gates, a new and forcible entrance was effected into Hades, that the Ministry of the Church, referred to in 1 Peter iii. 19 as the preaching to the spirits in safeguard, might begin. In short, this saying of Christ is a declaration of the absolutely universal Mission of the Church. Not even the gates of Hades should bar the way to the proclamation of the Gospel to every human creature, either in this life or beyond it. No human soul should lack the opportunity to refuse the evil and choose the good.

This was apparently the view of the medieval Church. In one of those fifteenth-century windows in Fairford Church there is a pictorial corroboration of this interpretation of the text, a depiction of the Lord, after His Death on the Cross, breaking down the gates of Hades, and followed, if I remember rightly, by the penitent thief.

It seems logical and legitimate to infer the inability of Hades to restrain sanctified souls from passing onwards, before the general Resurrection, to a partial, if not complete, enjoyment of the Beatific Vision.

S. E. B. Serle.

THE PARISH COMMUNION

The criticisms made by the Rev. Patrick Cowley in your September issue deserve thanks from all who are anxious to promote the Parish Communion. The " dangers " which he mentions are not imaginary, and we do well to take them to heart, not least the matter of preparation and its effect on devout communion. Moreover, all that he states of the value of the non-communicating Sung Mass as a means of teaching disinterested worship is true, and it has been a power in the Anglican Church during the last half-century. But his comments do not reach the heart of the Parish Communion ideal.

1. The familiar division of the aspects of the Eucharist—" 8 a.m. for

communion, 11 for worship"—can be rationalized, as he has done, but is based on fundamentally unsound theology. The action of the Eucharist is *one*. The Liturgy is not *both* an occasion for disinterested adoration *and also* of the divine feeding of human souls. It is *both at once*, adoration consummated in communion. To put asunder what God has joined together is sure to lead to distortion, as the history both of Eucharistic theology and practice sufficiently proves. Fr. Dix's article, so rightly commended by Mr. Cowley, indicates this. Is there not "danger" here?

2. The words "social" and "fellowship" in regard to the Mass are indeed too often loosely used. But the truth they express is also fundamental to a true Eucharistic theology. And that has to be both learned and expressed in a *local* fellowship. The Sacrament is the Sacrament of the visible Church, and membership in the visible Church is learned first in the local congregation. It is from that point that we are lifted into the wider fellowship with the Church Unseen. When Mr. Cowley says the "after-Mass mood is not friendship in the parish hall," does he mean "after-Communion" or "after-Worship"? But *why not*, if the Mass (either aspect, or both in one) is the supreme expression of the Church's life? One part at least of being "in the heavenlies" (as I recently heard the after-Mass mood described) is to mix with the fellow-citizens of the heavenly City. There is "danger," on the other side, of a selfish pietism.

This individualism at the Eucharist is very incompletely exorcised in most of us. (We are discussing here not private meditation, be it remembered, but the Church's liturgical action.) Mr. Cowley hints that not all will be communicating every Sunday. Is that not still a trace of individualism? Should frequency of Communion, when the Church meets weekly for her Sunday act of worship, be left to individual decision? Even the "easy" communions (over which one feels great sympathy with Mr. Cowley), if they have demanded something in the way of earlier rising than one's neighbours and the traditional discipline of fasting, are an expression of a desire for fellowship with the Christian congregation. Is that to be despised? (Not every town parish priest by any means would agree that the parish breakfast is "quite unnecessary," even after a 9 or 9.30 Mass.) If we are to hope for weekly Communion as a normal expression of membership in the Christian family, are we to expect our people to be present *twice* each Lord's Day at the Liturgy? Can anything less than weekly Communion be defended except as a compromise with circumstances?

If this reply consists largely of questions, it is to provoke thought. For there *are* dangers—not on one side alone. It may often be necessary to go slowly in order to attain an ideal. If the Parish Communion is the ideal, the approach to it is not helped by a rationalization of an imperfect stage towards it.

HENRY DE CANDOLE.

Fr. Patrick Cowley seems to have missed the significance of the Liturgical Movement. And has he really read *The Parish Communion*? It is there made quite plain that the Parish Mass is not an end in itself, but the most obvious, perhaps the only, means of expressing and teaching something of fundamental importance that has been sadly obscured by our traditional religious practice—namely, and in a phrase, *the meaning of Corpus Christi*.

Of the dangers foreseen by Fr. Cowley, the first, "of making the Mass only and not primarily (?) a service of reception," is one of those very tendencies against which so much of the literature of the Movement is deliberate polemic! Part of the remedy is to recover a true understanding of what "reception" means. Where this is grasped there will be less danger, not only of inadequate preparation but of that perilous scrupulosity which so often ends in a lapse to low standards.

In his second and third objections Fr. Cowley puts forward the emphasis on Sacrifice in the non-communicating Mass. But this is just the issue. Is not the emphasis misplaced, making external to the worshippers what should be participated in by the whole body? We are concerned with the Mass, the worship of the Body of Christ, and not with such pure adoration as disembodied spirits might offer to their Creator. We are concerned with Sacrifice, and not merely with sacrifice in general, but with the Sacrifice of the New Covenant re-presented in time and space by the Church. In this re-presentation the Corpus Christi is inseparable from the sacrifice; "in the very thing that she offers she herself is offered."* But the Body of Christ is the Christians. What then? "In our humanity we cannot offer ourselves to God; it were Pelaganism to imagine that we could. But, as those who in *communion* have had our membership of His Body renewed in us, we can offer ourselves in Him (*anaphora*); for it is Christ who has united us with sacrifice, and who now offers us up with Himself as members of His Body."†

If this is sound doctrine the importance of more general communion is plain. We cannot flatter the people with the notion that it is they, not the priest, who offer, when in fact they hold aloof from the sacrifice; that they can engage in the refined spirituality of pure adoration, when in fact we are doubtful about their fitness to communicate. Here is the prime significance of communion; not the mere "getting something" of which Fr. Cowley seems half ashamed. He is even uneasy about *thanksgiving*, because it intrudes the human element. But it is human worship we are offering, and its acceptability is assured not by our careful refinement of it into the pure disinterestedness of adoration, but by the mediation of our Lord, who makes us one with Him.

The marks of excessive "spirituality" and mistrust of humanity are present in Fr. Cowley's fourth objection. There have been pleas,‡ he says, for more fellowship in the social Mass. What is this fellowship? The answer, again, is—the fellowship of Corpus Christi. St. Paul speaks of this not as something that might help towards the cultivation of holiness, something his hearers might try to achieve, but as a *fact* about the Christians, a fact even about the local church, divided as it might be by its wider affinities and by individualisms. But it is a fact too often obscured, as at this day; the local fellowship seems to be despaired of, the conveniently intangible fellowship with the invisible only remains. When it is suggested that this fact of fellowship in Christ's Body should have expression, say, in a Parish Breakfast, the very novelty of the idea alarms. All kinds of dangers are foreseen: we shall stress too much the local fellowship, our outlook will become geocentric, we shall lose

* S. Augustine, quoted in *The Parish Communion*, p. 71.

† *Op. cit.*, p. 71.

‡ Exactly the view anticipated by Father Hebert (*op. cit.*, p. vii). It is a matter of affirmation, not plea.

the sense of the wider fellowship. These dangers are surely a little remote. Those parishes must be few where the fact of fellowship might not profitably be stressed *in the parish*; the danger of getting earthbound is, after all, inherent in our position as inhabitants of the terrestrial globe; and he that loveth not the Church Militant, whom he hath seen, how shall he love the Church Triumphant, whom he hath not seen? And while the majority might profitably spend more time in quiet recollection after their communions (and there is no guarantee of this in going home), well, they will have to breakfast some time; and it might be no less profitable to the *dévots* to make closer acquaintance with their fellows at the Parish Breakfast. There is nothing that defiles in talk and eggs at the Parish Hall, even when one has danced or played whist in it; still less is a common meal unchristian.

If there are any, as there may be, who have thought of the Parish Mass and the Parish Breakfast as bright new ways of getting people together, Fr. Cowley's objections might do good service in making them pause, but it is a little strange that he should write, "These dangers have not been mentioned in Father Hebert's recently edited book, *The Parish Communion*." A second reading, though it might not persuade him that his points are answered, must convince him that they are far from being ignored.

KENNETH HEALEY.

AFTER THE CONSECRATION

MR. TOWNER'S letter gives some thought to the congregation during "the period between the consecration and the communion." It is a subject in which the layman's opinions are treated with politeness rather than encouragement. Nevertheless, I still venture to doubt whether this "period" is sufficiently thought of in terms of Fr. Dix's "poor dumb beasts."

Surely there ought not to be such a "period." But there is. And, worse still, during it the worshippers are usually left to their own resources or fobbed off with private devotions that are an offence against Liturgy. Well may another contributor ask how to teach the sacrifice. Certainly, the layman who insists on finding out for himself what it is all about may wish himself to participate with heart and soul in pleading the Church's sacrifice. Then he may himself use the Roman Canon or the Scottish, American or 1928 Liturgies or, best of all, the South African Liturgy. That is a step forward. But it does not entirely relieve him of the untimely atmosphere of private devotions, nor does it completely remedy that dreadful anticlimax. Individuals may succeed in timing their own all too private prayer of oblation by the movements of the priest. But the unlearned as a body cannot, and there is no certain moment for them to say the great Amen.

It is not so important to speculate about the effect of the "period" on the congregation. It is fully and finally important to secure that the spirit and understanding of the unlearned should not recede from the one perfect offering of the whole Church without the slightest liturgical justification.

The 1928 Rite would have helped the poor dumb beast at this most sacred moment. But the experts maintain a doubtlessly important dispute about that rite. For that reason I also was disappointed by the

review of the Cowley Missal. I am happier in the thought that another great religious house has bravely adopted the South African Liturgy, and there the Sacrifice is taught and learnt as well as made.

There is no need to attack private devotions as such. As far as most laymen are concerned, they are in fact little concerned with the private devotions of the priest. And in any case the South African Liturgy provides for silent devotions of the whole congregation. The important fact is that, while doing so, it yet maintains the movement of Liturgy, faithful to the principle that sacrifice can be learnt in the making of it, when the unlearned participate in the sacrifice with the spirit and with the understanding also.

A. F. Dobbie-Bateman.

NOTES ON PERIODICALS

The July number of the *Revue d'Histoire Ecclésiastique* begins a set of articles by Father Mollat on the right of patronage in Normandy from the eleventh to the fifteenth centuries. He naturally finds that documents are not always forthcoming when he requires them. Father Looten provides no less than fifty pages of a discriminating account of the work of Richard Hooker. The background of Hooker's thought is clearly sketched, and then book by book his *magnum opus* is examined. The conclusion reviews a many-sided man as a learned man, a rationalist, the quality of the theologian, the writer, and upon all these aspects the student of Hooker will weigh the measured words of Father Looten. The reviews sustain their usual high level, and are worthy of the articles with which they are associated. Father Anthenius writes a short account of John Harris, private secretary to Sir Thomas More.

R. H. M.

Ephemerides Theologicæ Lovanienses. May, 1937.

This number begins with an interesting article, by Fr. Spicq, O.P., on the metaphors contained in the passage 2 Cor. iv. 7-9. The writer considers that all these participles are taken from the wrestling bout of the Greeks. They represent different stages in the struggle, from the first grip of the combatants down to the fall that does not, nevertheless, secure the victory to the adversary, *θλιβόμενοι . . . καταβαλλόμενοι ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀπολλύμενοι*

The second article is a rather lengthy one, in English, by J. J. Byrne, on "The Notion of Doctrinal Development in the Anglican Writings of John Henry Newman." This article makes a careful analysis of all Newman's works dealing in any way with the concept of "development" up to and including the "Essay" of 1845. The word is used in varying senses and applied to various objects. First it is development in the Christian's knowledge of Scripture, then in the Creed. Newman takes the Apostles' Creed as the original symbol and proceeds to shew how it develops into the Nicene and the Athanasian formularies. Lastly comes the development of the "idea." Religion has before it certain "Objects of Faith," by which Newman means actually the Holy Trinity and the Incarnation, and these do not develop. But the "idea" is

something impressed on the mind by an external object, and an idea is subject to development in religious as in other matters. The difficulty comes in, of course, when it is desired to distinguish between true and false developments. Here some criterion is obviously necessary. This leads Newman to put in the forefront of his theory the infallible authority of the Church. This infallible power alone can explain the advances made by doctrines, practically (as the writer says) "it alone can prove that the present doctrines of the Church are true developments of the scanty notices that are found in early Christianity," and he appositely quotes J. B. Mozley, writing in 1878 to the effect that "the doctrine of Papal Infallibility comes out as the keystone of Mr. Newman's whole argument, and according as he proves, or fails to prove, that doctrine, the argument stands or falls."

A third article deals with the mediæval elaboration of the Augustinian concept of *lex æterna*, the "law" which is eternal and immutable Truth and is recognized as such by the human mind. This subject was treated by an unknown writer and also by Alexander of Hales. There is in addition to these a Dominican treatise on the subject by Peter of Tarentaise, probably dated about 1264—the text is given in full. St. Thomas treats of *lex æterna* in the *Prima Secundæ* of the *Summa* as the *ratio divina* of all morality and as the archetype of all law. The Franciscans, however, keep closer to St. Augustine than St. Thomas is prepared to do. No doubt the *lex æterna* is written in us, and every human being can know something about it, not, however, as it is in itself, but in its effects or "irradiations" as the writer of this article puts it. But when all allowances have been made for a different point of view, this chapter on Eternal Law is the part of Thomistic moral philosophy wherein St. Augustine is most faithfully reproduced.

Fr. Bittremieux writes on Bonaventure, and another article argues that "four years" and not "fourteen" should be read in Galatians ii. 1.

W. R. V. Brade.

Les Questions Liturgiques et Paroissiales.

Only two issues have appeared this summer, the one for April, the other, a double issue, for June and August. Dr. Karl Adam continues and concludes in them his weighty articles on the dogmatic foundations of the Liturgy, shewing how the whole of Christian Theology comes to a point in the Mass. The April issue contains a tribute to the work of Dr. Parsch at Klosterneubourg, whose review *Bibel und Liturgie*, now in its eleventh year, has fostered both the liturgical apostolate, and now more notably a Biblical movement: in Austria, the latter is indeed said to meet with the greater sympathy and encouragement of the two! The Bulletin of liturgical literature notes progress in the effort to popularize among the laity, not only the Missal, but the Divine Office—a sign which has its message for ourselves.

The June issue opens with a notice of Dom Guéranger, the instigator of the modern Liturgical Movement, in connection with the centenary of the Congregation of Solesmes. Papers and reports given at the ninth Liturgical Week held at Mons in June fill several pages, and the accompanying double number of *La Vie Liturgique* is entirely devoted to it. (The earlier number of *La Vie Liturgique*, dated May, 1937, contains in convenient form a complete dossier of papers already printed

on Liturgical Missions.) Some statistics and information on liturgical advance in a district of some sixty parishes in Flanders, collected by a parish priest, are of interest. We note, among " means of promoting active participation in the Mass," " the distribution of the Eucharist at the Communion of the Priest—39 parishes. . . . The Parish Mass being also the Mass of Communion—11 parishes, the majority at 8 o'clock." In about a score of parishes, the dialogued Mass is customary. At Ypres on Palm Sunday the Blessings of Palms took place in a parish church and the whole congregation then went in procession to the principal church where Mass was sung for the whole town. In one parish, Vespers of the Dead was sung—to the general edification—" in the vulgar tongue " and as a collective act—but in the parish room, as it could not be in church ! A summary, itself ten pages, is given of a part of a most illuminating study by Père Browe (from *Jahrbuch für Liturgiewissenschaft*, 1935) on Devotion to Communion during the primitive and Middle Ages, based on a wide knowledge of the relevant literature, especially " Communion prayers." The early conception of Communion was as an integral act of the Liturgy, recognized as essentially an act of community, with no other preparation than participation in the Offertory, the recitation of the common prayers, the response to those offered by the priest, and a general conformity to his actions; no later thanksgiving, no concentration on—indeed, little thought of—personal moral and spiritual advance by Communion. The fully developed mediæval conception focussed attention on the individual, encouraged " spiritual Communion " (viz., meditation on the Passion) first as a preparation, and later in fact as a substitute for sacramental Communion, which became a rare act, " a private affair whose principal object was to obtain help for individual needs and the satisfaction of one's own desires . . . a means of perfection." When it was subtly suggested that some degree of sensible devotion was needed as a preparation for worthy Communion, the wheel had indeed gone full circle. This is a most useful and important study, the more because it recognizes the values of much of the later experience. But the contrast is striking and serious.

H. DE C.

REVIEWS

THE BIBLE VIEW OF LIFE. By S. C. Carpenter, D.D. Eyre and Spottiswoode. 7s. 6d.

Dr. Carpenter has written a book for which many will be grateful. It is an easy book to read, urbane and graceful, with flashes of wit and striking phrases in abundance; an untheological layman would find it absorbingly interesting and free from the idiom of the theological lecture-room. Yet it is at the same time a learned book, no flimsy stuff easily turned out by a ready writer, but a solid piece of Bible study. It reveals an enviable familiarity with Holy Writ, and (blessed decision!) Dr. Carpenter has not fobbed off the reader with barbed-wire entanglements of references, but has transcribed all or nearly all the passages of Scripture with which he deals. So the book is strong and sweet with the flavour of Scripture, and the writer's exposition is not the thrusting of personal predilections and whimsies upon the reader, but a reverent savouring of the truth and righteousness enshrined in the Bible. Sound critical scholarship is the foundation of the work, but it is never paraded for its own sake. Dr. Carpenter wears his doctor's gown with an easy grace and it covers a pastor's heart.

The clergy will find the book a great storehouse of matter both for their own meditations and for their preaching. It is not a systematic treatise, but rather a series of explorations in the vast field of the Bible, from which the author, like the scribe in the gospel, brings forth treasure new and old. It is a noteworthy and valuable feature that the relevance of the Old Testament to the New Testament is constantly kept before the reader's mind, and as each aspect of the Bible view of life is handled, the development of understanding is indicated with a delicate and sensitive touch.

Being constructed from the author's Scott Holland Memorial Lectures, the book is introduced by a fine appreciation of Scott Holland, in which we get large draughts of that great man's magnificent rhetoric, and recapture something of the spell of his vivid and rich personality. We then pass to the study of the dominant feature of the Bible, its faith in God. The living God, active in history, is the *dramatis persona* of the Bible, "a library ruled by one dominating and indeed almost exclusive motive." Dr. Carpenter shews that the Bible's faith in God is grounded in history and religion, not

in philosophy; but a philosophy of history is implied, with the resultant problems of predestination and freewill, the purpose of history, the origin of evil, and the destiny of man. "There is a suggestion," he says, "a very eager and devout suggestion, in the old Testament that, if God be at the helm, all must be well, but the Old Testament writers have not the material for building an effective bridge between that doctrine and the world in which men live. In the New Testament the connection, so far as the conditions of human life allow, has been made. There all life is overshone, and all problems illuminated, by the fact of the Incarnation." Illuminated, not entirely solved. "Terrible things are neither denied nor removed from the path. They are even seen more clearly, with a quickened sight and a larger apprehension. But there is encouragement and satisfaction for those who can discover for themselves, and effect for themselves, the application of the Cross to their own case." "The Bible believes in God because God is something that has happened. The Bible deals in religion, not philosophy. There is admittedly a great deal of incidental philosophy in the Bible, but the Bible is not in the least embarrassed when opponents say, 'You have not answered all the questions.' The Bible answers the one question which it believes to be of profound importance: the Bible affirms without hesitation that 'This is the Way.'"

This concentration on the Godward view carries with it the conviction that man exists for God. "On almost every page of the New Testament is some suggestion that it is only when human things and human beings are seen against the background of God, and as they were intended by God and as they are to be used for the glory of God, their real value is understood." It is suggested that the solution of the problem of man's destiny, in the light of the Bible's firm insistence on the glory of God as the only thing that matters, "lies somewhere in the meaning of the word 'eternal,'" which, as F. D. Maurice has said, means "appertaining primarily and expressly to God, and therefore distinct from and opposed to temporal." "This is life eternal," as St. John says, "that they should know Thee, the only true God."

The third chapter is entitled "The Course of True Love," and considers how the chosen people of God, the chief instrument of His purpose of self-revelation to man, came to tragic failure. Dr. Carpenter has a deeply sympathetic yet searching passage on the causes: excessive legalism, though there was much good in the Law and the religion of the Law; a jealous institutionalism, "the peril of those who belong to a good institution"; a failure to comprehend the largeness of their

vocation and the real purpose of the divine selection of their race, namely to be the Prophet-nation, the Priest-nation to the world. Yet though Israel failed God, God did not fail. He provided out of the old Israel a new Israel, which found an answer to all its questions in Christ. Dr. Carpenter takes four actual problems confronting the primitive Church—the problems of eschatology, Gentile Christianity, Christology, ethics—and shews how they were solved in the light of the conviction that the true purpose of God for the world is only to be understood in Christ.

And Christ, for the Bible, implies the Church, His body. "If it is true on the one hand to say, 'No Christ, no Church,' it is equally, though not so largely, true to say, 'No Church, no Christ.' Without Christ the Church would not exist. Without the Church Christ would be dead." *Civitas Dei* belongs to the Bible view of life, and that "Divine Action which redeemed humanity and baptized the old People of God into the new People of God, the Church of Christ."

These great matters occupy the first and larger half of the book. Dr. Carpenter adds valuable chapters on the literary and devotional beauty of the Bible, one on the Bible and social questions, and reserves for the end a study of our Lord's own view of life as revealed in the gospels. So he rounds off a book of great charm and great usefulness. A Biblical Catholicism is the ideal of Anglicanism, and this work, with its literary skill, its scholarship, and its demonstration—all the more effective because unforced—that sound learning is at home as the ally of Christian faith, is worthy to stand in the true tradition of Anglican divinity.

H. Balmforth.

The First Epistle of Clement to the Corinthians. Edited by W. K. Lowther Clarke, D.D. S.P.C.K. 4s. 6d.

This book should provoke keen interest among scholars, for, as Dr. Lowther Clarke says, Lightfoot's monumental work has for so long discouraged English writers from undertaking a re-edition that there is now a lot of leeway to make up. From the point of view of New Testament scholarship the work is timely. The critical study of the Synoptic Gospels is at a stage at which consideration is most necessary of Clement's negative attitude towards all that is most characteristic of the Gospels. This is perhaps the most important point in Dr. Lowther Clarke's book, that he calls attention clearly to the perplexing fact that the Church in the midst of which the Gospel of St. Mark is believed to have been written, and more

than twenty-five years later, in appealing to every element in the Christianity common to Rome and Corinth that might be relevant to the occasion, gives no *certain* sign of knowing our Synoptic Gospels, and in particular St. Mark. This is the more striking, in that Mark ix. 35-37 supplies the Dominical utterance so appropriate to the Corinthian insurrection that it would be strange not to appeal to it, if the Gospel were known in the same way that Romans, 1 Corinthians and 1 Peter were evidently known. On the other hand, there are Dominical sayings to which the Epistle makes appeal in form closely resembling those in the Synoptic Gospels. The parable of the Sower was apparently such a commonplace that Clement cannot speak of the fate of seed cast on the earth without falling into the opening phrase of the parable just as it is in the Synoptists, ἐξῆλθεν ὁ σπείρων, in spite of the fact that this immediately involves him in an awkward change of tense. The problem is no simple one. Dr. Lowther Clarke insists on the small extent of our knowledge of the background of our earliest Christian documents and the number of questions we can hardly hope to answer.

However, there appear to be alternative routes by which explanation may be sought for these anomalous facts. The first, which is the one chosen by Dr. Lowther Clarke, assumes our Synoptists were unknown at Rome in A.D. 96, and supposes that there was, nevertheless, a fixed catechesis on Dominical teaching akin to the matter in Q. He makes the tentative suggestion that if Rome was the matrix of the Marcan Gospel, it was in Alexandria that it was completed and copied; and that it was thence, and not from Rome, that it came to the other Synoptists.

The second alternative is to suppose the Gospels known at Rome (if Mark and Luke were known, Matthew need not have been, so far as Clementine evidence goes) and seek explanation of Clement's behaviour solely in terms of his and the Church's attitude towards them. Attention may be called to the extraordinary literary character of St. Mark. Would the Church of the Epistle of Clement readily give liturgical reading to such a book? Does not Luke shew us how *outré* it appeared to a second-generation Christian? On the other hand, his polite and modern Gospel, dedicated to a Christian aristocrat, is hardly more obvious as a subject for liturgical reading. This, however, is not the place to carry the argument further. The important thing is to shew that Dr. Lowther Clarke has laid bare the urgency and difficulty of the problems with which the Epistle of Clement confronts us. It is from the New Testament specialists that we must look for solutions.

After this, the most interesting thing that comes from re-

examination of Clement is the observation of his intensely ecclesiastical mind. His absorbing interest is to maintain a type of community life in its perfection which he believes to be a dear object of the Divine will. Church order and liturgy, and the moral principles which he deduces from the Greek Old Testament and certain Christian writings, as from inspired sources recognized by the Church, engross his attention. It was in that community life that, for him, Christ was principally known as the revelation of God and executant of His will. What wonder if a book of vivid but surprising and even disconcerting memoirs of Christ's ministry like the Marcan Gospel remained, even when known, for long unassimilated in such a Church ?

The matter gains clearness from the opening of Dr. Lowther Clarke's introduction, where he deals with the predominance of Gentile "Godfearers" in primitive Roman Christianity. If an important body of such persons first embraced the Gospel, it would seem to them the confirmation of their hopes and the establishment of their spiritual ideals. For this very reason it would involve no complete revolution in their ideas. And this is exactly what the Epistle of Clement suggests. It has the outlook of the "Godfearers," much ennobled by its contact with the Christian evangel, but not otherwise radically changed. There is much in Christianity by which it is unaffected. Clement, for example, reveres the Epistle to the Romans, but is quite impervious to its most fundamental ideas. And, as Dr. Lowther Clarke says, he is quite apart from the "realized eschatology" of St. Mark. In fact, the most notable thing about this Clementine Christianity is that it is so completely unapocalyptic. It reveres the natural order as permanent, and sees in the State a Divine ordinance. So much is this the case that Clement will explain all persecution as the fruit of "jealousy," of which the archetype is the sin of Cain. The foes of St. Peter and St. Paul, and of the more recent martyrs and confessors, were not really the representatives of the State, but persons possessed by perverted religious rancour—that is to say, unbelieving Judaism bears all the blame for what the Church has suffered, that the Imperial Government may bear none.

It is not easy to follow Dr. Lowther Clarke all the way in speaking of Clement as standing in the main stream of tradition from the great Apostles. Clement is remarkable for his imperviousness to ideas outside the range of his characteristic interests. He takes up so much of Paul as he can without taking Paulinism. He takes that from St. Peter which 1 Peter represents; but if Mark is representative of Peter, that side of Petrine Christianity was closed to Clement. There

were many other streams of Christian tradition, as Walther Bauer has argued in his *Rechtgläubigkeit und Ketzerei*, than that in which Clement stands. And his may be called "main" chiefly in the sense that it evinced a power of drawing others into itself.

But this is to push the argument further than Dr. Lowther Clarke does. A notable feature of his book is its restraint. He does not drive the reader his way, but puts the right threads into his hands and leaves him free to find his own way. The English version which he provides keeps closely to the style of the Revised Version of the New Testament. Lighfoot's text is translated, even where, as in xli. 1 or xliv. 4, another reading is to be preferred. But here, as in the cases where Lightfoot's judgment has been confirmed by later events, as in xxvi. 7, the notes supply the essential facts.

Dr. Lowther Clarke's version is more readable than Lightfoot's, and not less accurate. Critical readers may find here and there something they would have rendered differently; but there is always something to be said for Dr. Lowther Clarke's way. We have here, in short, as good a version as we can well demand. And it is to be hoped that it may make this interesting, impressive and significant writing known, and better known, to many. For such readers as may be drawn on to a further and more technical study of the document and its problems there is a short and excellently chosen bibliography.

W. Telfer.

NOTICES

Scientific Monism: A Plain Man's Philosophy. By A. E. Maddock. James Clarke and Co., Ltd. 5s.

The " plain man " is better equipped than most to deal with the long story of Evolution. He knows all about mathematics, biology, philosophy and ethics in their most modern phases. But he is a sturdy rebel against the old Materialism, and his short essays are a sign of the times. His philosophy is a well-sustained effort to " have it both ways " —to bar out all possibilities of supernatural guidance in the course of emergent Evolution, and to substitute in the place of Purpose what he calls inner Directivity, while at the same time holding to Naturalism. It was surprising in old Haeckel how the spiritual unexpectedly emerged from his material portmanteau; there is no such surprise in Mr. Maddock's Monism, for in his philosophy Nature and Spirit start in double harness, and evolve together. The Volitional element is there in the protoplasm, and grows side by side with its less active partner, until on attaining consciousness it takes the reins and drives ahead. (Forgive this confusion of metaphors.) Mr. Maddock thus arranges for the emergence in one course of real Freedom and (so he thinks) of real Responsibility, and of Mind " as a primary and eternal principle of Reality," holding to " ultimate universals " of absolute validity.

Here is a pretty field for Christian philosophy: but is it not a queer philosophy of Nature ? We must go behind the plain man's admissions and presumptions, and inquire what such a spiritual principle implies, and, when we come to Ethics, what is the ultimate ground of Responsibility.

It is a pity that quite a useful study of Evolution should shew such blindness to the place of religion in development—and be so silly as to say with regard to religion that " the Scholastic Philosophy affords a conspicuous and melancholy example of its influence."

W. J. Ferrar.

The Substance of the Christian Faith. By Emeritus Professor Ronald G. Macintyre, D.D. Angus and Robertson, Ltd. Sydney. 3s. 6d.

This is no textbook of Theology, but a statement such as the ordinary man could understand of the main beliefs which are the basis of the Christian religion. Written and printed in Sydney, it is full of the practical spirit which befits a young country. Dr. R. G. Macintyre is a Presbyterian, but he does not consider the question of orders to be important, nor, indeed, credal statements of belief. Though with regard to the doctrines of the Trinity, the Atonement, or the Last Things no sensible Catholic need quarrel with his orthodoxy. His chapters include: Why Religion ? God in the Old and New Testaments, The Trinity,

Christ, The Holy Spirit, The Atonement, Assurance, The Church and the Sacraments, and The Last Things.

The central reality of Christian experience is stressed throughout, and doctrine deduced from personal awareness of Christ.

A useful book for honest inquirers.

W. J. Ferrar.

Darwin's Theory applied to Mankind. By Arthur Machin. Longmans. 7s. 6d.

This book reads like an echo of the middle of the last century, when everyone was reading *The Origin of Species* and had not yet separated the idea of Evolution as describing a process from Darwin's particular theories of Natural Selection and Survival of the Fittest as the main factors in development, and when Herbert Spencer was applying these theories to Psychology and Ethics. The author applies them to "mankind," and feels that he has "solved the problem to his own satisfaction" after twenty years wrestling with the problem.

The result of this prolonged bout is given in 260 pages dealing with the history of prehistoric man (that inexhaustible store of evidence), arguing that the First Morality is survival value, and that man's original state (*pace* Aristotle's assertion that he is a political animal) was not social; with the History of Civilization, the Interpretation of History, and with Human Nature. Fortunately he has given us a summary of the whole in the final chapter, which he recommends us to read first. It gives excellently the gist of what goes before, and we may from it quote a sentence which gives the gist of the Summary—"Man is, in short, like all other living things, just a bundle of survival values."

Now if by a thing having a survival value it is merely meant that it survives, then obviously everything that exists has survival value. To say so is merely to utter a truism. But, even so, we cannot say that "his instincts *are* the survival values of his original state." Some of them may *have* such value, though it is difficult to see how that can be said of the instinct of self-sacrifice which has played so great a part in the evolution of man.

But the survival values he refers to are those of war, which successfully seizes the things of value that others possess; of marriage regarded mainly, if not entirely, as a means of continuing the race; and industry and civilization which create things of value and secure them to the possessor. These, he urges, are the great factors which make man "a bundle of survival values."

The criterion of value seems to be almost entirely material and utilitarian, though he recognizes that "prosperity and progress conflict with the things that give instinctive pleasure," and asks: "To what extent shall he (man) pursue goodness, and to what degree happiness?" Naturally, therefore, he thinks that "the answers of the Greeks, Romans, and of Christianity are outworn and unadapted to the new conditions of this industrial age."

Then, suddenly, in the last pages he advocates the idealism of Berkeley and, with a kind of death-bed repentance, bids us "beware of all materialist philosophies which see an ultimate end to the universe, and a final

end to man in the phenomenon of death," and ends with really fine words, in which he says:

> " It is as if the Almighty had set us a problem of life in practice, and implanted in us an instinct which gave us no rest until we had solved it. . . . And ultimately we may possibly hope to gain some better apprehension of the Author of life, after we have gained some better knowledge of the laws of life."

A hope which has a distinct " survival value."

C. F. Rogers.

Books on Sören Kierkegaard are beginning to multiply, since the first poor beginnings were made a quarter of a century ago in introducing this great thinker to English-speaking people. First there came articles in periodicals; then, in 1935, Dr. Bain's study of his life and religious teaching; and now a translation of the *Philosophical Fragments*, by Professor Swenson (Oxford University Press, 7s. 6d.), and a translation from the German of a lecture by Theodor Haecker (Oxford University Press, 2s. 6d.).

What we may call the personal interest in Kierkegaard is naturally growing less. The breaking of his betrothal made " Enten . . . eller " doubly interesting to his contemporaries; for them, too, he was a " Gade original," a figure of fun of the streets, whose clothes were so peculiar; and the violent attack on the State Church with which his life ended made him famous even outside literary circles. This last, however, is now considered by all to be unimportant; and though psychologists must still study his personality as affecting his thoughts, we are for the most part content now to value the thoughts themselves, and to estimate, if we are brave enough to hazard the attempt, his influence on Ibsen and Barth.

The theology of Kierkegaard is based upon the thought of the Transcendence of God, the thought, he would say, revealed to us in the Word. The Incarnation is the supreme paradox, and every distinctively Christian truth must have in it the element of paradox, must present the possibility of being upset in Christ. For we are as much contemporaries of this paradox as were those alive at the time of the earthly ministry. The Penitent Thief was the typical Christian of those days, because, presented with the paradox in its extremist form, he judged not according to the appearance, but believed. And every Christian, in the strict sense of that word, goes through a like narrow gate.

This gospel is hardly as a net to catch many small fish, but a harpoon for a Jew whaler; and Schrempf, the translator of Kierkegaard's works into German, says: " He reduced Christianity *ad absurdum*, and (against his will but quite conclusively) handed it over to the history of religion "; that is, we may presume, it is so hard to be a Christian in Kierkegaard's sense of the word, that Christianity must cease to be looked on as a practical faith for living men. Haecker, however, regarding the philosophy of transcendence as false, and finding the importance of Kierkegaard in his earlier devotional writings, calls this nonsense. His desire is to interest his hearers in a great Christian thinker: this he has done admirably, but we cannot help feeling that the difficulties of Kierkegaard's teaching have been left out. We miss what S. K. would call the possibility of being upset.

Professor Swenson, on the other hand, has translated for us one of the most difficult of Kierkegaard's works, under the title *Philosophical Fragments*. We cannot but hope that *Indovelse i Christendom* will soon be given us in English, for in this letter the characteristic theology of Kierkegaard is presented in the simpler form of addresses. Brandes considers it one of his most important books; and it is so because exacting truths are given in an attractive form. The *Fragments*, however, were published six years before *Indvoelse*, and the book is more of a treatise, in form and language less readable. Professor Swenson has written a good Introduction to it and its author, and has laboured hard to give us a translation exact and intelligible. The notes at the end are excellent, but one could wish that there were included in them explanations of such words as "oieblikket" and "Gentagelse," master-thoughts of Kierkegaard for which "moment" and "repetition" are inadequate. There are one or two misprints in the Latin (p. 35) and French (p. 75), but any criticism of a discoverer who is sailing an unexplored sea, as Kierkegaard would say, is forgotten in gratitude that he has made the attempt.

F. W. Fulford.

Valiant in Fight: A Review of the Christian Conflict. By B. F. C. Atkinson, Ph.D. Inter-Varsity Fellowship of Evangelical Unions. 2s. 6d.

This is Evangelicalism as we, or rather our forefathers, used to know it. The spiritual descendants of the early Christians are found in the modern Evangelicals. The idea of sanctity attached to a church building is heathen in origin. The heathen priesthood lived on in the Christian clergy. The Church seasons are heathen. The observance of Good Friday and Easter "might have been harmless." Of St. Francis Dr. Atkinson says: "His attempts to preach to birds can only arouse ridicule, while his kissing of the wounds of a leper rightly produces disgust." Poetry translated into action is anathema to him! "The majority of Roman Catholic priests in Spain today are atheists. . . . The Church of Rome . . . has always preferred free-thinkers to Christians." "The Anglican Evangelical Group Movement . . . approximates yearly more closely to Anglo-Catholicism." The Jesuits have organized an alliance of Italy, Germany and Japan. The writer expects Atheism and Romanism to destroy one another in mortal conflict, leaving the pure Evangelicals to hand on the Gospel.

W. K. Lowther Clarke.

The Doctrine of the Work of Christ. By Sydney Cave, D.D. Hodder and Stoughton. 6s.

This is an account of the principal interpretations which have been given of the atoning work of our Lord. To write such an account is a difficult task for more than one reason. It is well worn ground: every theologian must deal with it in some way; and hardly any theologian is perfectly satisfied with the way in which his predecessors have dealt with it. In consequence the literature is voluminous and exhibits

extraordinary variations. The doctrine in itself is mysterious and does not admit of a clear and plain statement. Moreover, there is no approved ecclesiastical statement of it, and consequently we cannot clarify our thought by relating it to a formula. Finally, any exposition of the doctrine of the Atonement is of the nature of a theodicy in a sense which would not be true of other doctrines. Dr. Cave's work is that of a profound scholar and an accomplished teacher. He uses Aulén's classification of theories of the Atonement into the Classic, the Latin and the Subjective, though he is far from satisfied with this nomenclature. He points out the elements of truth in each of these groups, but in rejecting Moberly's teaching he seems to put aside the most hopeful of modern attempts at a synthesis. Some synthesis there must be. The "Classic" theory explained nothing: its attempts at explanation were grotesque, and the view of the Atonement as a purely divine act is out of harmony with the Gospels and Monophysite in character. The "Latin" theory, which, as Dr. Cave points out, has its "Orthodox Protestant" counterpart, does not fully satisfy the mind, the conscience, or the heart, and leads directly to a "Subjective" reaction. Yet if nothing was objectively accomplished on the Cross, why has the Crucified a claim on our subjective devotion? Moberly's treatment of the subject may not be the last word, but its great merit was that, by emphasizing the work of the Holy Spirit and the consequent union between God and man, it prepared the way for a synthetic doctrine, which might perhaps be labelled "Representative." No book could give better guidance than the one under review towards such a reconstruction.

✠ Kenneth Brechin.

The Oxinden and Peyton Letters, 1642-1670. By Dorothy Gardiner. The Sheldon Press. 15s.

The study of history has changed almost beyond recognition since the days when it was regarded exclusively as a chronicle of big and dramatic events, and the rounded periods of Macaulay taught us to see the pageant of British history through the refracting medium of Whig spectacles. If, however, we no longer see things so clearly and in such contrasted colours, it is not because history has ceased to concern itself with moral judgments, but rather because the historian sees that his subject is one that concerns life as a whole and cannot be limited by any *a priori* ideology.

It is well to remember this when we approach the history of the Civil War or the Restoration period, which in its main outline is well known to the average schoolboy, or where the Whig tradition still holds the field despite the witness of Mr. Belloc and others. What is less well known, however, though equally important, is the life which was lived by the people of England during this period. Even civil war cannot destroy domestic life, nor prevent young men and maidens falling in love, as the delightful letters of Dorothy Osborne make abundantly clear. Mrs. Gardiner, therefore, has done well to give us another volume of the Oxinden and Peyton papers, and to continue the story down to Henry Oxinden's death in 1670. It is idle to pretend that these letters possess either literary merit or great personal interest: some are rather

tedious, others difficult and complex, but they do provide material of the highest importance to a real understanding of country life and domestic politics in Kent during the Civil War and the period that followed.

Henry Oxinden (1609-70) is known as a poet only to the curious or literary connoisseur, and his claims to be regarded as an earnest minister of the Gospel (he was Rector of Radnage, Buckinghamshire, from 1663-70) were never advanced even by himself. These letters are valuable, however, just because they enable us to see the Civil War and the Restoration through the eyes of a very ordinary man. A supporter (but not a too zealous one) of the King, his fortunes declined with the success of the Parliamentary forces, and were never compensated by Charles II., although Henry was "minded to take Ordination," and in fact did so, in order to make the King's task easier. The letters in this volume are as varied as the characters who write them, from Charles Nichols, the fiery preacher of the Gospel (and strangely enough a great friend of Henry's), to affectionate letters (in which business is strangely mingled) from Henry to his wife. We read of the decay of some families and the enrichment of others: of estates lost and estates gained. In short, we gain an insight into the life of the time which no formal history could possibly give.

Mrs. Gardiner has done her work well, and has made the reading of these letters easier by her notes on persons mentioned and her explanations of references to contemporary events. The labour involved must have been immense, even though we are sure it was a labour of love.

We hope it will not go unappreciated. E. F. Carpenter.

The Oxford Book of School Worship, Part II. Juniors, Part III. Seniors. Issued by the Oxford Diocesan Council of Education. S.P.C.K. 3s. 6d.

The Birth of Christianity in the Light of To-day. By Edith Ratcliffe. Allenson. 5s.

Signs which He Did. By "Lamplighter." Burns Oates and Washbourne. 3s. 6d.

A First Book of Songs and Carols for Children. By Helen Cobbold. 5s.

The Oxford Book of School Worship (for Juniors and Seniors) enlarges the good work already done by the Oxford Diocesan Council of Education in the provision of lesson-books for teachers. The whole subject of school prayers, adapted to the children's needs and imbued with an ideal of worship, is still in its early stages, and such a book as this will certainly help. The authors aim at something that shall be an act of worship and not merely the repetition of a collect and a school prayer, and have collected much suitable material. Whether they are wise to use so eagerly the litany-method may be doubted. The occasional litany has its uses for children as for adults, but it may easily become uninspiring if used very often. The reader, appreciative as he will be of the whole book, may also doubt whether the two pages devoted to Private Prayers are adequate for the revolutionary work that awaits teachers here, since so few children have received at home much effective

instruction. On the other hand, the section of School Hymns is admirable, and it is a relief to find that Hymns Ancient and Modern and the Church and School Hymnal receive the commendation, implied in the choice of hymns, which they continue to deserve.

"Signs which He did" contains thirteen stories from the Gospels told to children in the imaginary setting of a modern home, in which the children ask questions and discuss. The method is interesting and deserves study.

Miss Ratcliffe wished to give to the ordinary reader the account of the New Testament which modern scholarship has established. Previous books by the same author had dealt with the Gospels and the teaching of St. Paul. In this posthumous work she has provided an introduction to the remaining books of the New Testament. It is very carefully and capably done, written with a clarity and simplicity that should make it really valuable for the teacher who is beginning New Testament study.

Mrs. Cobbold attempts a difficult and important task, that of giving to very little children teaching about God in music that is within their grasp and is none the less music, also in verses that they can enjoy, which are yet worthy of their subject. The book is beautifully illustrated, because it is meant to be in the hands of the babies themselves sometimes. It is a piece of educational work that was well worth doing, and it may be hoped that others will be encouraged to work on Mrs. Cobbold's lines.

J. R. Lumb.

Towards a Religious Philosophy. By W. G. de Burgh. Macdonald and Evans. 10s.

Professor de Burgh is a well-known classical scholar who has written with insight on the legacy bequeathed to us by the ancient world. Now he applies his wide knowledge and his even wider sympathy in the set of essays before us. Their subjects include logic and faith; metaphysical and religious knowledge; the idea of religious philosophy; theories of immanence; the time-process, eternity and God; God and the world-order; the significance of the argument from design; the relations of morality to religion; self-realization; humanism, theocentric and secular; and his conclusions. No one is better aware than the author of the enormous range of matter he has covered, and the fairest thing to state of these essays is that they are thoughtful and, better still, thought-provoking. Naturally we turned to those upon which we ourselves had been thinking—say, to the fine review of the menace of unreason in the world of our generation. Mr. de Burgh is perfectly entitled to discuss the breakdown of rationalism towards the close of the nineteenth century and the rise of the many doctrines in general designed to meet this unforeseen state of affairs in general, and the reactions of the intuitionism of Bergson and the pragmatism of James in particular to this breakdown. Now with a man of smaller mental stature this would simply involve what intuitionism and pragmatism could or could not do to meet the needs thrust upon them. But the author is not a man of such stature. Throughout this book he asks the reader to travel beyond the limits of the discussion in question as an event in his book, and to connect it with the larger whole of which it is only a part. This is in truth an ambitious task, yet we think Mr. de Burgh has succeeded in his ambition.

R. H. Murray.

A Dialogue of Comfort against Tribulation. By St. Thomas More. Burns Oates and Washbourne, Ltd. 7s. 6d.

This is a reprint, modernized with regard to spelling and punctuation, of the treatise written by St. Thomas More in the Tower of London in 1534. In his Introduction the editor, Mgr. P. E. Hallett, gives some account of the composition of the work, how it was primarily composed for the members of More's own family and did not become public until long after his death. So intimate a book, written by one in face of martyrdom, has a tragic interest for the reader. The sombre occasion of its composition notwithstanding, the book still bears evidence to the vivacity and charm of its author's style, and the play of his imagination is as light as ever. In a spirit of Christian stoicism—but how the adjective alters the substantive here!—he goes through the various temptations which might induce a man in circumstances of danger and difficulty to forsake his faith and his God. Under the thin disguise of Christians threatened by a Turkish invasion, he discusses such matters as suicide, a method of escape that might easily suggest itself as the ruthless enemy drew nearer, or the natural shrinking from imprisonment, banishment, confiscation of goods or pain or death. As a kind of text running through a great part of the book, he uses the 91st (Vulgate 90th) Psalm—the various sorts of temptations or tribulations of Satan are "the arrow that flieth by day," or "the business walking in darkness," such things as apprehension, fear, pride or worldly desires and ambitions, the "negotium" or "business" of the twilight, or, again, the assault or incursion of the "midday devil," that is to say the open persecution and destruction wrought by the "Turk." All these, says the Saint, the Christian athlete must meet and overcome. Many shrewd sayings and anecdotes are given by the way, many stories told, and Æsop quaintly quoted more than once. There are a few, but only a few, references to the theological controversies of the times, such as purgatory, penance and the invocation of saints ("he that will not do it, I let him not to leave it undone," p. 147). On such points the author's remarks are orthodox and sober.

Mgr. Hallett has certainly performed a service to the reading public in making this little book readily available, but it is to be regretted that there is neither index nor table of contents. W. R. V. Brade.

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